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ABSTRACT

THE IDENTITY-EQUIVALENCE DECALAGE
PIAGET'S CONSERVATION

IN

PROBLEMS

by

MICHAEL CHISERI

The broad objective of the dissertation was to
rigorously explore the theoretical and empirical status of
the so-called

identity-equivalence decalage

in Piaget's conservation

problems.

To date,

(Elkind,

1967)

the decalage

issue has centered upon demonstration of the developmental
precedenee of identity p r o b l e m s — single or within object
co m p a r i s o n — over equivalence problems--two or between
object comparison.

The hierarchy of difficulty

has been

attributed to the requirement of a relational comparison
between two distinct stimuli in the latter paradigm.
Additional consideration reveals,

however,

that such

a decalage could be a result of a difference in the c o n 
creteness: of the illusion of inequality,

and not n e c e s 

sarily due to the differential number of stimulus objects
employed in identity and equivalence paradigms.

Two

identity and two equivalence paradigms--each with and w i t h 

out the concrete i l l u s i o n — are described

and used as the

basis of an experiment to examine the aspects of a decalage(s).
A proposal made by Elkind
structure necessary

(1967)

contends that the cognitive

and sufficient to success in the

standard equivalence t a s k — with concrete illusion — is a
compound

of that required

for an identity t a s k — without

concrete i l l u s i o n — plus a syllogistic or transitivity
deduction.
Piaget's

The role of the operatory conservations

theory of genetic epistemology

discussed

and the

inconsistent with

Elkind proposal found
TGE and,

(TGE)

in

is extensively

to be formally

in psychological fact,

of d o u b t 

ful propriety.
Four to six year old subjects were used in the
experiment which directly contrasted group performances
the four conservation paradigms
analysis of age effects.
initial quantitative
manipulated

and also allowed for an

A recall cue pertaining

to the

relationship of the stimuli was also

as a repeated measure factor.

s c o r i n g — dichotomous

in

judgment,

Three modes of

judgment plus verbal

expl a n a 

tion and Elkind c r i t e r i o n — were employed and each analyzed
at the nominal
conservation)
metric

(all or none)
measurement

and parametric

and interval

(continuum of

levels via respective

statistical methods.

non-para-

Stochastic

models of fortuitous performance for the judgment and the
Elkind

criterion were prepared

appropriate

and used to qualify,

significance levels,

as pass or fail.

at

individual and group scores

The results indicate that the decalage
the Elkind proposal is predicated,

upon which

is due to the d i f f e r e n 

tial concreteness of the illusion and not to the number of
stimulus objects.

Regardless of the recall cue,

the s u b 

jects performed equally well in equivalence and identity
paradigms when the illusion concreteness was equated,
scored

and

significantly lower when the illusion was concrete

and could

be directly perceived.

level only a single child

At the concrete

perceptual

passed, and there were no di f 

ferences across age, while

in the paradigms where the

illusion is left to a remembered image of the initial co n 
figuration,

the older children performed better than the

younger ones.

Regarding

conclusions,

the three scoring pr o 

cedures were highly consistent within and between levels of
mea surement/statistics.

For each criterion the parametric

analyses showed more statistical power,
Elkind criterion was the more

and in general the

sensitive measure.

Although the results are interpreted
rate with TGE and somewhat
sis,

they do not entirely

age range(s)

there exists

even when concreteness

to be c o m m e n s u 

ruinous to the syllogism h y p o t h e 
vitiate it.

Perhaps at

an identity equivalence

some other
decalage

is equated, in which event it could be

that concrete identity plus syllogism is the basis
crete equivalence solution.

This seems,

however,

for a c o n 
to be

unlikely as the present evidence clearly indicates that,
given level of illusion concreteness,

at a

performance in identity

and equivalence conservation paradigms are developmentally
parallel.

5ECTI0N I

GENERAL

N0TI0N5 OF CONSERVATION

Introduction

As preamble

to discussion of some fundamental aspects

of Piaget's conservation problems,
mented that

Elkind

(1967)

aptly co m 

"The quantity of literature growing up around

the conservation problems introduced by Piaget and his co l 
leagues

(e.g.,

Piaget,

Inhelder &. Szeminska,

1952;
1 960)

Piaget & Inhelder,

1962;

Piaget,

testifies to the significance

which both Piaget and other investigators attach to these
problems

[p.

460]."

That the literature

up to 1967 is volumi

nous is evidenced in compendiums due to F l a v e l l (1963),
(1961),

5igel

(1964),

Sigel and Hooper

(1968)

Hunt

and Wallach

(1963).
Critical and extensive recaptiulations of the more
recent research are not yet abundant but this

is not due to

a dearth of interest in the conservation p r o blems— to wit
perusal of current
Notably,

journals of human development will attest.

the conservation literature

has centered on:
tion concepts

1) ontogeny and training of the c o n s e r v a 

(Brainerd &. Allen,

theoretical and methodological
Hall &, Kingsley,
1969),

of the past five years

1971a,

b*'J , 2) consonance of

orientations

1 968 ; Limber &. Chiseri,

(Brainerd,

1974;

1973;

Smedslund,

and 3) analysis of the mental operations theoretically

1

2

necessary and/or sufficient to solve the problems
5choenfeld,

1 972;

Northman &. Gruen,

1 970;

(Elkind &.

Schwartz &. Schol-

n i c k , 1970).
Although inferences regarding the requisite mental
operations

are tendered,

this dissertation

formal and empirical analyses of the
paradigm.

is focused upon

standard conservation

A prevalent concern is with the utility of co n s e r 

vation problems to the
in children.

study of evolving cognitive structure

The formal analysis is insufficient to d e t e r 

mine the actual state of affairs,

or even to establish one

model as more substantive than the alternatives,

but i m p l i 

cations for Piaget's theory of genetic epistemology
be drawn

throughout the text with

various

(TGE) will

degrees of factual

support.

Standard

Conservation Paradigm

Before embarking onto research specifics it is
desirable

to establish what

tion problem."
mass,

weight,

is usually meant by "conserva

Whatever is the particular content
length)

of the conservation task,

of experimenter manipulations
same.

(e.g.,

the sequence

and subject responses is the

The subject is first presented with two concrete

stimuli,

A and B, that are qualitatively and quantitatively

equivalent,
objects,

and so judged by the subject.

Then one of the

say B, is transformed to B* in such

a manner as to

vary its configuration but obstensibly not the quantitative
attribute of interest.

That is,

A and B* are not

3

configuratively equivalent but are still so quantitatively.
The subject is then asked to judge the specified quantitative
relationship between A and B*.

If he asserts their equality,

this is said to be a conserving judgment.
considered

Whether he is

to have grasped the particular notion of c o n s e r 

vation depends on the criteria employed in the experiment
(e.g.,

judgment,

etc.)

The paradigm is symbolized in Figure 1.1,

Time

verbal explanation,

Event

multiplicity of trials,

Subject

Experimenter

t

A= B

agrees

does A = B?

t^

B~^B*

observes

change B into B*

^2

B*

- A?

Fig.

1.1.

does B* = A; why?

Standard conservation paradigm.

Conservation Concept
A concise definition of conservation is rather
elusive but it is often--albeit much too loos e l y — alluded to
as that

"situation"

lar quantitative

(Hall &. Kingsley,

1 9 68 ) where a p a r t i c u 

attribute of an object is invariant

certain changes in other attributes of the object.
example,

across
For

the weight of a ball of clay remains the same if it

is transformed into a sausage shape

(and no clay is believed

to be physically added or taken away).
rather inadequate definition,
thetical clause is omitted,

Under this weak

and

especially if the final p a r e n 

much criticism is levied

at

4

utilization of conservation tasks to explore
development of children.

The ground for this

usually couched in what is
"no-nonsense"

the cognitive
criticism is

apparently to be construed

position which

notes that,

as a

in empirical fact,

the supposed invariant attribute is not necessarily constant
across the specific,
transformations.

or a host of other possible,

qualitative

The point is made by Hall and Kingsley

(1 968 ) :
Typically, experimenters ignore the fact that different
characteristics do change over different manipulations
. . . In addition, authors often only ask questions about
a very limited part of the conservation concept, while
representing the passing or failing of a few questions
about this same part as being indicative of whether the
subject has the total concept [p. 196],
Hall and Kingsley presented
part here as Table 1.1)
characteristics
this

a table

(reproduced in

which relates certain quantitative

and the empirical conservational status of

quantity under specific

configurative transformations.

Their argument includes this table of "well known facts"
testimony or proof that the conservation tasks,
implications drawn by Piaget,

and the

are at best spurious due to the

empirical vagaries of the quantitative
in the problems.

as

attributes employed

They concluded:

"l\lo characteristic conserves over every rearrangement of
an object.
Thus, exhibiting that a child believes that
shape changes do not alter weight does not mean the
child has mastered conservation of weight . . .
In other
words the child learns that each object characteristic
has its own unique pattern of conservation [p. 190],
Hall and Kingsley are promoting,
concept of equilibration,

in lieu of Piaget's

a learning theory explanation for

5

TABLE

1.1

CONSERVATION STATUS OF WEIGHT AND MASS
UNDER FOUR TRANSFORMATIONS

Transformation
Characteristic
Shape

Weight

Temperature Altitude

Horizontal
Displacement

Conserves

?

Changes

Conserves

7

?

7

7

Substance
or
*
Mass

? = conservation depends upon the accuracy of measurement
and assumptions made.
* = nonmeasurable

6

a child's conservation performance that centers on what can
only be called empirical facts which require sophisticated
operational definitions.
selves a bit,

In fact,

for in Table 1.1

they have deprived the m 

the "conserves"

rating for

weight under shape changes should be replaced by at least a
The weight of a solid object can,
change under a simple
of sublimation
liquids)

in empirical fact,

shape transformation.

(exactly analogous

The phenomenon

to evaporation for

is that situation which obtains:

transition under suitable conditions directly between
the vapor and solid state of a substance.
At a given temperature the rate of sublimation,
per unit time,

or weight loss

is mathematically described by the differential

equation:
dw/^
Where:

= kA(P - pp)

dw/dt = weight
A = surface

loss per unit time,

t

area

P = vapor pressure of the substance,
prope rty

an intensive

pp = partial pressure of the substance in the
surrounding medium
Thus changing

a ball of clay to say a flat disk,

will enlarge the surface area to volume ratio and cause an
accelerated weight loss
ambience).

Actually,

(i.e.,

mass transfer from object to

that is empirically,

absence of a shape transformation
will find a change in weight,
is at equilibrium

(pp = P).

even in the

the mere passage of time

unless

the sublimation process

A sufficiently sensitive scale

7

would detect the change in weight under the transformation,
just as a sufficiently

educated scientist would not need a

scale to believe in the possible mass transfer.
Evidently,

according

to the empirical argument,

servation of mass or substance
disdain because

should be held in the highest

it is essentially unmeasurable or at least

it depends on which theory of matter is invoked.
haps edifying

con

It is per

to note here that of all the conservation co n 

tents mass is conceptually the most abstract,
for number and the least

except perhaps

amenable to direct experience

or

empirical verification:
The modern concept of mass, however, in contrast to those
of temperature, light and force (weight) has no sensory
counterpart nor does it reveal itself directly in any
conceivable experiment.
It is a construct [Jammer, 1961,
P- 2].
Yet its conservation
tinuous

quantity)

(as substance,

discontinuous or c o n 

is repeatedly found to be one of the

earliest acquired by children

(Elkind,

1 963 ; Lovell &. Ogilive,

1 961 a, b).

this facility

1 960,

is due to the

nition or measurement

b; Flavell,

It is likely that

lack of a common empirical def i 

procedure(s)

tend to confuse a child

1961a,

that,

in the task,

and make him slow to recognize

would
and/or

hesitant to rely upon the logical possibilities of the case
before him.

The net effect of the mitigation of empirical

hardware probably makes it easier for the child to accept and
remember

(in the face of the configuraiive disparity)

intial equality

and the identicalness

of the transformed object.

Then,

the

(sameness of substance)

minimally encumbered by

8

considerations of apparatus,
racy,

units

of measurement and accu

he can apply whatever logical operations

he may possess.

and deduction

Thus from a Piagetian vantage it would seem

that mass is ideally

suited to the purpose of the c o n s e r v a 

tion task.

undoubtedly because his purposes as well

Whereas,

as theoretical foundations are different from Piaget's,
hard empiricist
Given

finds mass the most

the

inadequate quantity.

the facts of the empirical criticism and the

assurance that conservation is not designed to assess the
child's notion o f mass or force,

it is prudent to ask,

what

then is the utility of the conservation concept and paradigm?
Much of the dissatisfaction expressed by Hall and Kingsley
and others

(Brainerd,

1 973;

Hall &, Simpson,

1 968 ) might be

attributable to their rejection of the intended role of logic
in conservation
stimuli.

and its independence of empirically-defined

A plausible

analysis of the logic in the c o n s e r v a 

tion paradigm is described by 5medslund

(1968)

as:

A subject is said to possess a notion of conservation if,
and only if, to 5, the conclusion "A=B'", follows neces
sarily from the premise, A=B and "nothing is added or
subtracted whileB is transformed into B*L1968],
With this conceptualization,

which is far more commensurate

with Piaget's than is the previous loose definition,
is somewhat
thing

axiomatic— i.e.:

(A = B and B* = B)

If a child,

premise,

equal to the same

are equal to each other

under the above,

logically be due to,

"Things

the task

(B* = A)."

concludes B # / A it could

for example,

the absence of a crucial

a belief in the falsity of one of the premises,

or
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an inability to organize-the

information

into the appropriate

logical conclusion.
In a footnote,

Brainerd

(1973)

essentially reiterates

the Hall and Kingsley position and dismisses Smedslund's
(1968,

1969)

invocation of the logical necessity implicit in

Piagetian tasks because:

"Many Piagetian tasks involve only

approximate physical properties of objects about which there
is no logical necessity at all
tion that many,

[p.

175]."

perhaps all except number which is entirely

a logical construction,

of the quantitative properties

in Piagetian tasks are not invariant
attributes of the object.
and verified
formation
tion.

There is no que s 

However,

used

over changes in other
the empirically defined

equality of quantity before or after the t r a n s 

is simply not crucial to the concept of c o n s e r v a 

It is only important that in the experimental situation

the child believes and r e m e m b e r s , the initial equivalency of
the objects and that,

as far as the child is concerned,

nothing was added or substracted during the transformation.
The truth or falsity of the premises
moot;

i.e.,

and the conclusion

is

it is the validity of the argument or t a u t o l o g i 

cal nature of conservation that makes it amenable to i n f e r 
ences upon the cognitive structure extant in the child.
importance of the conservation response

is that it may be

indicative of certain mental operations that,
contradictory perceptual evidence,
that the amounts are conserved.

The

in spite of

lead the child to conclude

10

Additional testimony to the confusion on the role of
logic is found in another quote from Brainerd

(1973):

For example the cognitive structures of the concrete
operational level (middle childhood) permit
only the
assimilation of concrete facts while the cognitive
structures of the formal operational level (adolescence)
permit the assimilation of purely conjectural info r m a 
tion [ p . 176].
This statement is rather misleading.

The essence of concrete

ness for the concrete operational stage is that the o p e r a 
tions are applicable only to the objects themselves and the
correspondent actions

taken upon them;

i.e.,

the operations

are insufficiently formalized for abstraction and general
inference.

Flavell

(1963)

describes the limitation

crete operations are concrete,
structuring
crete things

and organizing

relatively speaking;

as:

"con

their

activity is oriented towards c o n 

and events in the immediate present

[p. 2Q3]."

Although the actual construction of the physical concepts
(e.g.,

substance,

weight,

volume)

contributes to the hori

zontal decalage most always found for the respective conserva
tion tasks,

it is primarily attributed to the concrete nature

of the emerging logical operations,
the specificity of hard,

and not to any notion of

as opposed to soft,

or abstract

facts.
At base the conservation problems can all be logically
dealt with by the same operations
cedures for each content

and the experimental p r o 

are very similar.

Often identical

materials and questioning are used— yet the sequence of u n d e r 
standing in children

is consistently:

number, s u b s t a n c e ,
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weight and volume,
problem.

even if the same objects are used for each

Furthermore,

according to Uzgiris

(1964)

the co n 

servation attainment sequence is apparently the same with
material or set of objects
tion on the conservation
materials

[p.

although,

any

"an i n d i v i d u a l 1s p o s i 

sequence is not constant across

83a]," presumably due to the evolution and

differentiation of the operations occurring in various s p e 
cific environments.

The concreteness then is with

the mode of application of the logical

regard to

operations and lack of

facile transfer from a particular task to another similar one.
And surely one should not conceive of such concepts as mass,
weight or number as being altogether or even essentially co n 
crete for indeed these concepts are abstractions of physical
objects,

as is any such quantity.
V.

A Stance on the Meaning of Conservation
The most

interesting aspect of Piaget's conservation

problems is that within a defined culture the development of
conservation,
program,

apparently independent of any specific learning

is consistently observed to occur in children of a

given age group.
the word

Depending

"development"

upon one's tolerance for nuance,

in the preceding

been replaced by construction,
divination and so forth.
be,

invention,

However vague

the essence in each is clear,

that develops within,
child.

sentence might have
acquisition,

these synonyms may

conservation is a concept

and in the theory constructed by,

the

It is a complex product of thought and experience
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that is not in any way meaningfully characterized by,
restricted to,

equal weights,

masses

or

or volumes of objects.

The behavior of children in the conservation problems
is indicative

of an appeal to logic,

that

is,

the quantities

should logically conserve and the perceptual data can b e —
conserving

children finally believe

it i s - - m i s l e a d i n g .

The

mental constructs postulated by TGE to account for c o n s e r v a 
tion are based in logic,

and are categorically different

the physically defined stimuli and concepts
them.

It should

from

used to assess

always be remembered that the beakers do not

really contain the same amounts any l o n g e r — probably never
di d — because of evaporation,

surface tension,

subtle

spills

and other empirical facts.
Pursuant to a content-free conservation concept,

it

is suggested that the pre-operational child is something of
a naive

realist or hard empiricist,

weight sensory data.

For example,

in that

he tends to o v e r 

he may be aware of the

possible but if he sees an event that is consistent with
something he already

"knows"

or believes to be true,

other possibles no longer exist.

Specifically,

servation problems the child is at first

In the absence of evidence to the
(amounts,

II.

Height

colors,

shapes,

etc.)

in the c o n 

guided by two

thetical structures that may be characterized
I.

hyp o 

as follows:

contrary,

things

remain invariant.

is invariably correlated with amount,

is more.

than the

and taller
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Struction,

or disposition,

documented in Piaget and
(1967)

Inhelder

I has been observed and
(1958)

and stated

in Piaget

as

The study of various forms of nonconservation which we
are still undertaking shows that they do not result from
a spontaneous tendency toward change (because the child
is on the contrary above all a conservationist) but from
aninitial lack of reversible operations [p. 80].
The well known Frank's experiment

reported

is also testimony to the existence of I„
repeatedly observed
conservation

in Brunner

Structure

in the reasons children

(Miller,

Grabowski &. Heldmeyer,

(1964)

II is

give for non1 973 ) and was

found to be the case in the present study too.
Given the above,
portrayed
beakers,

as follows.

a typical conservation

trial can be

The child is presented with identical

A and B, each filled to the same height,

agrees that the amounts are equal.
B into a thinner beaker,
ing to structure

B*,

and he

The experimenter empties

as the child observes.

Accord

I he expects the amounts to remain the same.

Upon observing that the liquid in B* is taller than it is in
A (or was in B) the child is in a perplexing situation.
Structures

I and II are in conflict and the experimenter is

asking if B* and A have the
empiricist,

same amount of liquid.

II and the perceptual

The concrete operational child

is however enpowered

with certain mental operations and ascertains,
in some way,
more,

an

the pre-operational child resolves the conflict

through the consonance of structure
data.

Being

that the taller liquid does

or justifies

not have to mean

and concludes the amounts are still equal.

It is all

14

the more interesting

that these children rather insist that

the post-transformation equality is a necessary condition.
With respect to the preceding portrayal,
intended to be amenable to TGE,

which

the crucial component in the

conservation paradigm itself is the perceptual data.
the compound

of the percept,

is

and structure

I and

It is

II that

engenders the cognitive conflict in the child and requires
some additional mental operation--physical operations

are

p r e c l u d e d — to resolve the situation in favor of conservation.
A paradigm that did not induce a conflict or that could be
solved by direct perceptual

1

of semi-logical means would not

adequately assess the status of the conservation concept for
the child or the structure that underlies it.

Reversibility and Conservation
Regarding the role of conservation and the concrete
operational period an important property of thought
reversibility.
ble

Simply,

if it has a logical

a procedure or operation is reve r s i 
inverse.

In speaking of activities

like seriation and 'minimal classification
Piaget

(1970)

is

(without inclusion),

notes their semi-logical status as:

such

ordering or classifying or setting up of correspondences
does not involve

reversibility

so that we cannot

as yet speak

1
It should be noted that the volume is a physical
invariant inthe conservation tasks discussed, and to the
extent that such volume can be precisely perceived, there is
a direct perceptual solution to the problem.
And should it be
that children construct the notion of conservation by a selec
tive attention to this physical invariant, and inattention to
the variable height and diameter dimensions; then regards con
servation and reversibility TGE and the present argument are
somewhat diminished.

of operations,

and because of this there are as yet no pr i n c i 

ples of quantitative conservation
equal to the previous

(a divided whole is not

undivided whole).

be derived from the above paraphrase,
without reversibility,
will yield rigorous
A formal

it should be clear that

TGE expects there is no structure that

quantitative conservation.

look

at reversibility must be done with

reference to the modern

algebra concept of Groups,

Piaget freely alludes implicitly,
itly.

Whatever else might

to which

and at times quite e x p l i c 

It is generally accurate to say that the Group concept

is a model that Piaget employs to characterize much of the
essence of cognitive structure.
tem

(or structure)

arbitrarily,

that consists of clearly defined,

elements

sys

albeit

and a given combinatorial operator that

can be applied to the elements.
operator

A Group is an abstract

b,

c and

*, the nonempty set is said to be a Group if

the

fallowing postulates

hold

For

elements a,

(Van Der Waerden,

1953,

Curtis,

1963):
Composition.

The Rule of combination associates every pair

of elements with a third
e.g.,

element which is also of the set,

if a • b = c, then c must be a member of the set.

Identity.

There exists at least one

for any group element a,
Inverse.

element called the inverse,

quence,

law.

that is,

such that

i • a = a.

For each element,

Associative

element, i,

a, there exists at least one
a',

such that a'

• a = i.

The sequence of combination is of no conse
a • (b • c) = (a • b)

• c.
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A common example of a group is the set of integers
under the operator of addition.
another integer,

Any sum of integers yields

the identity element is Q since each inte

ger added to 0 yields that integer,

and the inverse of each

integer exists as the negative of that integer where the
sum of the inverse and the integer yields □, the identity
element.
Within the TGE model of thought,

reversibility is

the analog of the inverse property of the group definition.
Reversibility is often loosely,
to TGE,
allows

but not exactly contrary

described as that aspect of a mental process which
for a return to the point of departure.

is a logical,

In TGE,

it

rather than an action or perception based,

reversibility that is a harbinger of the concrete operational
period,

and the operations responsible for the development

of conservation

in children are identity

and reversibility.

Reversibility is further divided into inversion/negation
and reciprocity/compensation.
Evidence that such operations

are in fact employed

in solving conservation tasks is often to be found in the
verbal explanations given by children in justification of a
correct

judgment.

An identity operation is taken to be

represented by "nothing has been added or taken away,"

i.e.,

it is both the same exact material and amount.

Inversion

and reciprocity are respectively inferred

"if this

from,

(B*)

17

is made back into that
"the difference

(B)

it will be the

same

(amount)"

and

on one dimension is compensated or made

up

for by the difference on the other."
A number of investigators
1969)

have warned against

as indicators

(Elkind,

Hooper,

taking explanations too literally

of actual modes of solution.

this advice centers on the belief that

The reason

for

actually children

(must) eventually resort to a syllogistic
and B = B*,

1967;

argument

(if A = B,

then B* = A) to solve the problem and that id e n 

tity is instrumental to arriving at the second premise,
in the argument.

B = B*,

Doubtless the verbalizations are not error

less modes of thought,

but

I should like to suggest that the

explanations indicative of reversibility

are quite valid,

while the identity references in the absence of reversibility
are not necessarily rigorous.
identity of amounts

Dr more

specifically,

an

is really the sought-for conclusion

whereas reversibility is the operational device from which
this

conclusion can be validly derived.
An identity,

attributes,

resulting

in an equation of objects

that is not grounded

logically constructed,

in perceptual

or

data must be

and the reader is here reminded that

the empirical heart of the conservation tasks is that the
subject is confronted with an illusion of inequality.
two beakers of fluid appear to contain different
their identicalness on this attribute
percept,

As the

amounts,

is challenged by the

thus an identity argument is rather insufficient and

of itself is little more than tautology.

Two avenues will be
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taken in support of this notion,

first a succinct reference

to some statements in the TGE literature and then a scrutiny
of the formal structural m o d e l — the Group.
Elkind

(1967)

noted that Piaget

reciprocity as the significant

(1952)

proposed

concrete operation in the

child's realization that the observed transformation
irrelevant to the quantity relationship.
Piaget

(1968)

has modified his position

the operatory level the conservations

is

More recently
and asserted that at

are based on identity

and reversibility and
that the arguments used to justify the conservations are
interdependent.
For example, identity does not n ec es 
sarily precede reversibility but results from it i m p l i c 
itly or explicitly [p. 99].
It seems that the operations are perceived
complex to be applied

as an ultimate

as a whole and that the transitional

or less operatory levels can be characterized by discrete
applications
1958).

of the elements of the whole

A quote from Piaget

(1952)

(Inhelder & Piaget,

commenting on the rigors

of the development of conservation of number helps to clarify
the TGE position on identity:
There certainly is also identity, and the colligated set
is of necessity identical with its enumerated elements,
but this identity is the result and not the origin of
the reversibility, since the essence of thought is irre 
ducible to identity [p. 201 ].
In the Group,
identity element

the analog of the whole,

it is the

and inverse element that comprise the revers

ibility concept since the identity element is the product of
the combination of an element with its inverse.

The logical
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operation of reversibility yields
can be viewed as both the result
bility.

the identity element which
and criterion of re ver si

The point to observe is that the elements of impor

tance are the identity and inverse,
sibility incorporates

and the concept rev er

them both via the combinatorial

operator defined on the Group as a whole.
no inverse element

Definitionally

can exist without the identity element

and reversibility reduces to the definition of the inverse
element/concept.
this concept,

All this is to say that reversibility is

and as it is defined on identity it cannot be

construed independent
of reversibility
mer operation

of identity.

Formally the interdependence

and identity is definitional but as the for

is predicated

upon the latter it remains to

be asked in what instances,
primitive or less rigorous

if any,

might identity be more

than reversibility.

The Group can also be defined where its elements
transformations or mapping of a set of objects.
tant of such transformations
mapped
I(x)

object.

For example the identity transformation,

invariantly,

upon itself.

identity transformation

or one that maps an

The image of x under the

is exactly x.

attribute x that is logically invariant
quantity while,

Each resul

is the respective image of the

= x, might be described as a No-Op,

object,

are

In conservation the
is a particular

due to some physical transformation at hand,

a perceptual configuration is altered.

Indeed if the child

had no intuitive notion of identicalness or the expectation
that x can be quantit atively invariant,

there can be no

2D

conservation,

but also with only an identity operation there

is not logical verification of the expectation,

and t h e r e 

fore no rigorous conservation.
If the conservation

problem is further modeled

upon

the group concept where the general elements are now t r a n s 
formations

(T) of objects,

or their attributes,

we have for

reversibility T'

* T = I , in which

T' is the inverse t r a n s 

formation of T.

The reversibility operation yields the

identity or No-Op transformation which when applied to the
obj”ects leaves them saliently unaltered.
serve,

the formal problem the child must

sented as,

X • T(x)

the given transformation of the

will render the object

that is,

(attribute),

X cancels the transformation T.

transformations

solve can be repre

= x, where X is a variable operation which

when combined with T(x),
object,

In order to con

(operations)

x, to be unchanged;

A set of formal

that will logically suffice

are

shown below:
Problem:

solve X • T(x)

Solution:

I(x)

= x, for X.

= x

identity

T'

• T(x) = I(x)

reversibility

T'

• T(x)

substitution

Thus,

= x

X = T' .

The above corresponds to a group of transformations
variable,X,

is the inverse operation,

and the

T'.

It may be that the identity operation is more general,
perhaps fundamental,

and therefore likely to precede re ve r s 
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ibility in the developmental sequence.
tainly identity is crucial,

At any rate,

but insufficient,

cer 

to co ns er va 

ti on — provided of course that a trivial sufficiency of
identity is adequately challenged,
conservation

task.

as it is in the standard

In the usual task the transformation

results in clear perceptual data that implies x may not have
prevailed

unaltered.

With the Group model rigorous con serva

tion is represented as an isomorphism between the requisite
cognitive

structure and the Group structure.

The effective

mode of solution implied by the model is an inseparable
compound of identity and reversibility which will be referred
to as

I/R in subsequent chapters.
A final word on how the formal description of rever si 

bility might translate into the less formal operatory notions
seems appropriate.

Inversion /negation

is a mode of reversi

bility that constructs the equality of amounts through

a

reverse transformation which theoretically negates the
observed transformation.
haps the more thorough
a decentration.

Reciprocity/compensation is p e r

justification in that it also implies

For example,

in the continuous

quantity

problem it indicates a recognition that the change in height,
H , is exactly compensated for by the reciprocal change in
width,

W.

The inverse transformation

the resultant null transformation,
• Z^H = I.

of /^H is Zb*W and

I is the logical product,
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SECTION

DECALAGE

II

AND PARADIGMS

Four Conservation Paradigms
The standard conservation paradigm

(CE)

described in

5ection 1 assesses the belief in the invariance of a qua nt i
tative relation between objects when only one of them is configuratively transformed.
equals,

Objects A and B are given as

then B is transformed to B* and

directly compare A and B*.

There is no allusion to or i nte r

rogation on the relation between the
and its transformed state,

the subject asked to

B*.

(previous)

Elkind

(1967)

state of B

has referred

to the CE paradigm as "conservation of equivalence"
to distinguish

it from what he calls

"conservation of iden

tity" which involves a quantitative relation,
objects,

but only within a single object.

symbolized as Cl,

in order

not for between

In this paradigm,

an object's quantity in the post-transfor-

mation state is compared with its quantity prior to the
reconfiguration.

Cl is diagrammed in Figure 2.1.

Cl involves no intial comparison between any objects
and conservation is obtained when a subject, having observed
only B and its transformation to B*,
has remained the same.

asserts that the quantity

Note that in the CE paradigm no

reference to B vs B* is ever made,

although

in the event of

a correct response the experimenter may infer that the subject
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tD
*1
t2

■

5ub i ect

present B

observes

refers to B

B

observes

change B into B*

B*

B = B* ?

does B = B*;

F i g . 2.1.

T ime
*0

*2

Event

tD

Experimenter

document B

observes

marks the liquid levej

B

observes

change B into B*

B*

B = B*?

does B = B*;

2.2.

Event

B —

Expe rime nter

Sub iect

A = B

agrees

>B*

does A = B?
cover A

observes

B*= A ?

Fig.

why?

CIC p a r a d i g m .

obscure A from view
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why?

Cl p a r a d i g m .

Subject

Fig.

T ime

Experimenter

Event

T ime

change B into B*
does B* = A; why?

2.3.

CEN paradigm.
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arrived at B = B* enraute to A = B * f or alternatively,

that

B ^ B* was intermediate to an incorrect response.
Another within or singleobject paradigm

is possible

where the original configuration of B is still visible after
the transformation.

This paradigm will be referred to as

CIC and is diagrammed in Figure 2.2.

P r o c e d u r a l l y , CIC is

exactly like Cl except that the configuration of B is made
concrete and remains

visible when the child responds to the

question on the equality.

Of possible

theoretical

practical importance is that CIC possesses
the original shape of B, while in Cl,
paradigm,

and

a concrete cue to

also a within object

the pre-transformation configuration is left to

imagery and cannot be viewed directly.
A fourth paradigm,
two objects,

as in CE,

diagrammed in Figure 2.3,

involving

but not a concrete cue to the shape of

object A will be referred to as CEI\I.

The sequence of events

in CEN is exactly as in CE except that just prior to the
transformation,

object

A is obscured

the theoretical and practical

from view.

Here too,

importance of this mo di fication

is that the configuration of A is not directly visible when
the question regarding B* vs A is asked.

As in Cl the p e r 

ceptual disparity between the items being compared must be
remembered by the child through some mode of imagery.
The four conservation paradigms can
the basis of whether:

the post transformation comparison is

between or within object,
pre-transformation

be categorized on

and the perceptual data for the

configuration is concrete or left to
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imagery.

Table 2.1

displays the distinctions

among

the

paradigms.

TABLE 2.1

THE CONSERVATION PARADIGMS CONTRASTED ON THE OBJECT
AND PERCEPTUAL FACTORS

Object
Between

Within

Concrete

CE

CIC

Imagery

CEN

Cl

Percept

There

are six possible decalages between the four paradigms

taken two at a time,
confounded

That is,

but the two diagonal comparisons are
an observed decalag e could

be the

result of the difference on the obj ect o r percept dimension,
or an interaction.

Identity-Equivalence Decalage
It is evident that in all the paradigms there is no
purely perceptual*means
to conclude
Elkind,

by which a subject could be expected

that the quantities conserve

1966,

1967).

For example,

(Beilin,

1964;

in CE a correct response

should involve the immediate past experience of having
that A = B and observed B —► B*.
response,

In addition,

agreed

for a correct

it would be sufficient to recognize that B = B* and

*Except via the volumetric invariant.
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then deduce that B* must equal A too.

The reader should

verify to his satisfaction that a judgment of B = B* enroute
to a solution of CE is tantamount to a solution of Cl.

The

Cl paradigm can be said to be nested within CE and possibly
the respective solutions are so related.
Elkind
nested

(1967)

assumed the solutions are indeed

and proposed that the conservation of identity within

an object is a logically necessary,
dition

but insufficient,

con

for CE and what is further needed is the deductive

argument of the form:

if,

A = B and B = B*, then B* = A.

In his analysis of an identity-equivalence decalage,
based the distinction on the number of stimulus
the respective tasks
were Cl for identity,

Elkind

objects in

and the specific paradigms singled out
and CE for equivalence.

It was

explicitly postulated that in addition to the ability to
solve Cl,

a syllogistic

solution to CE.

reasoning capacity was necessary for

The syllogism is a special case of t r a n s i 

tivity which is the prime motivation for labelling it here as
the transitivity-syllogism

(T5) operation.

quences of Elkind's proposal

Direct c o n s e 

are:

1.

Cl + T5 = CE.

2.

Cl is developmentally prior to CE.

3.

T5 is developmentally prior to,

4.

CE is a proper subset

of Cl, that is

there exist elements

of success in Cl that

are not in CE,

but all elements of

or simultaneous with CE.

success in CE are in Cl too.
The inclusion of the possible simultaneity of CE and T5 is
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because the Elkind proposal specifies an identity-equivalence
decalage with Cl prior to CE,

and although he makes it clear

that TS is a later development than Cl, he requires

only that

CE does not precede T5.
A brief digression on what the paradigms represent
is in order.

Cl,

CE,

CEN and CIC are intended to strictly

refer to paradigms and not to cognitive:
tions or processes.

structure,

op era 

The mental constructs are postulated to

be parcel to a solution of the conservation paradigms but not
in the least identical with them or,

more

behavior(s)

The solution oriented

they appear to inspire.

behavior exhibited by a child

should

For example,

literally read:

the

or not,

of the requisite

the Cl + T5 = CE equation

structure necessary to solve Cl

plus the structure necessary to syllogistic deductions
are necessary and,
to solve CE.

meant is,
result

other things being controlled,

For the sake of efficiency,

bols will be used,

the

in the paradigms is taken to be

a consequence of his application,
cognitive structure.

importantly,

as in the equation,

"requisite structure for."

(T S )

sufficient

the paradigm sym

when what is really
Little

confusion should

as it will ordinarily be quite obvious which meaning

is intended.
Northman

and Gruen

(1970)

elaborated upon Elkind's

proposal and modeled the CE paradigm as shown in Figure 2.4.
This model of CE incorporates the components cited by Elkind,
Cl and TS,

and also a recall operation.

did not remark as such,

Northman and Gruen

but it would seem that especially if
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Step

Operation

1.

A = B

Given

2.

B -* B*

Observe

3.

B = B*

Identity of substance and conservation
of identity of amount, or compensation
or reversibility

4.

A = B

Recall

5.

B* = A

Transitivity or deduction

(TS)

Fig. 2.4.
Sequence of steps and mental operations
in the Equivalence Conservation Task:
Northman and Gruen
(1970).

a TS operation is necessary,

the recall step is very crucial

and perhaps a large problem for children of pre- or concrete
operational

age.

If the initial premise,

or perhaps never fully appreciated,

A = B, is forgotten

the subject is left to

compare A and B* on perceptual grounds only,
his status on B vs B*.
Schoenfeld

(1972)

regardless of

In a discussion of CE,

stated,

Elkind

and

"This paradigm makes it clear that

the conservation task requires a kind of syllogistic r e a
soning

[p.

529]."

Their rationale, which is taken as an

implicit emphasis of recall,

for the necessity of TS was that

A could not be judged equal to B* independent of the events
at tj-j and t^

in the CE paradigm.
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Elkind and Schaenfeld
"identity conservation

(1972)

also declared that,

should precede and be a necessary

prerequisite

to equivalence conservation

they argued,

Cl can be shown to appear earlier than CE in

childrens'

cognitive development,

for CE must be T 5 .

[p.

529]."

If,

then the missing operation

There are a number of premises inherent

in such logic and in general these have been neither cited
or doubted by investigators of the decalage.
cial,

and doubtful,

assumption is that there is only one way

a child can appropriately
premise

solve C E .

for proposal of Cl plus

sufficient.

The most c r u 

This would be a required

T5 as both necessary and

A second dif ficu lty involves both theory and

methodology in that a CI-CE comparison is confounded by object
and conflict dimensions,

thus it would not be clear how these

two factors contributed to any observed decalage.
little

Thirdly,

notice has been made that if Cl plus T5 is fou nd—

somehow— to actually be necessary and sufficient for CE,
this would have marked implications

then

counter to TGE fundamental

hypotheses on conservation and its importance to assessment
of concrete operations.

It is to this matter that attention

will next be directed.

An Issue
As a preamble

to his proposal,

Elkind

(1967)

noted

that TGE operates under the assumption:
Identity and equivalence conservation are simultaneous
in time, and that the age of equivalence conservation is
also the age of identity conservation, so that it is
legitimate to infer the age of the latter from the age at
which the farmer is attained [p. 23].
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As stated above there are no inherent contradictions
in referring to identity

(i.e.,

servation processes while
paradigm,
implies

within a single object)

con

assessing these with an equivalence

whereas the Elkind proposal

a contradiction.

for TGE

(Cl + TS = CE) clearly

TGE asserts that identity is not

sufficient for the quantitative

conservations,

yet

I/R is

defined on a single object and is postulated to be the basis
for conservation.

Any variance regarding

development likely centers upon which

simultaneity of

of the within object

paradigms would be predicted by TGE to develop in parallel
with CE.

An answer is to be found in a few quotations

from

the Genevan literature.
Usually a solution to a conservation problem is
attributable

to an identity operation if the child justifies

his judgment with,

"nothing

it is the same [Elkind,

has been added or taken away so

1 967]," to wit Piaget

(196B ) has

observed,
The real reason children of this age recognize the c o n 
servation of substance or weight is not identity (the
small child is just as capable of seeing that "nothing
is added or taken away" as is the older child) but the
possibility of a rigorous return to the point of d e p a r 
ture [ p . 46].
,
By "rigorous"

it is here interpreted that Piaget intends

logical and consistent.
In responding to spme of the work
(1 966),

much of which employed

reported in Bruner

identity paradigms,

the

Genevans alluded to the irrelevancy of Cl to assessment of
concrete operations by noting,
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At no time did our procedures mask those aspects of the
situation that tend to create obstacles to the correct
solution.
Rather the experimental arrangements and pr o
cedures were designed to elicit awareness of the conflict
(i.e., between anticipation and outcome, or more pro
foundly, between perceptual pregnance and operational
necessity) and of its sources, which is one of the p r e 
sumed necessary conditions for the transition from a
limited form of reasoning to the operational systems
[inhelder, et a l ., 1966, p. 161].
Translated into the concepts and labels of this dissertation,
the above means that the child
B and B*,

anticipates the equality of

and it is the concrete percept of the apparent

inequality of A and B* that impells the non-conserving
ment in the pre-operational child

and induces

jud g

(requires)

application of I/R in the concrete operational child.
□n this matter a final
gates ambiguity surrounding

quote from Piaget

(1967b)

miti

the role of identity itself,

As regards identity, what sets it apart from the concept
of conservation is that identity is only qualitative and
can therefore be acquired by the dissociation of a per 
ceptive quality from other perceptive quantities:
e.g.,
with liquids if a = color, b = quality of being a liquid
and c = shape, then abc stays "the same color" for the
subject because a and b have not changed andonly c is
modified (conservation however involves quantities that
are not perceptive, but have to be constructed [p. 533].
Any equation of identity and equivalence con ser va
tion for TGE requires that the conflict be empirically based
in concrete perceptual data,

for which the appropriate within

object paradigm is CIC and not Cl.

Furthermore,

previous

to the current wave of research on the identity-equivalence
decalage,
(Bruner,

it had been amply demonstrated that Cl precedes CE
1 966;

Piaget &. Inhelder,

1 963 ), and it seems d o u b t 

less that TGE would attribute this to the differential

impact
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of the conflict.
is dependent

The conflict is attenuated in Cl since it

upon a remembered image of the intial con fi gu ra 

tion whereas in CE the conflict data is fully visible.

This

is not to say that imagery is entirely incapable of inducing
a conflict,

for both Bruner

(1966) and

Piaget

(1968)

have

reported that recall of the intial level of liquid in B can
cause the child to renege upon his pre-transformation p r e 
diction of equal amounts once the liquid

is actually poured

and he sees the level in B*.
The major difficulty with Cl is that in the absence
of the hard conflict there is a host of alternative
modes,

solution

some more primitive than operational and others

simply devious.

Of the latter kind,

common and obtains if the child,
of liquid in B*,

then assumes,

memory falsification is

upon observing a higher level

concludes or pointedly fa br i

cates that the liquid was higher in B than it really was.
However he falsifies the original level,

he can then judge

the amounts equal on the basis of equal heights,
doing

and in so

has nicely resolved the conflict by massaging the real

data to fit his structure.

Also,

without the visible data, a

child may forget the initial configuration

and simply follow

his expectation of constancy to reach a correct judgment.
Another solution could appeal to a non-rigorous

global

identity where the same material implies the same amount.

A

very young or inattentive child might not even realize that
the heights are different
advanced

in the first place.

solution within TGE is analogous

A fairly

to the Group concept
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of identity for which the transformation,
No-Op.

An identity operation

the minimal conflict situation

I, is the null or

is more likely to suffice in
but as previously discussed

it is not characteristic of the increasingly organized struc
ture of the concrete operational period.
In sum,

the Cl task is little more than a test for

a concept much like object constancy,
Piaget
others,
sooner.

an ability which

says is evidencedat about eighteen months
Bower

(1966),

have declared to be present

and which
a good deal

An imperceptible quantity is at a higher level of

abstraction

than the continuance of being

of object constancy,

and the quantities

are all beyond the pale of perception.

and sameness nation

used in conservation
Cl does not provide

a direct confrontation of possible different

amounts and the

question of equality can be superficially resolved through
recognition of the sameness

of substance,

gratuitously attached as a mindless
the

rider.

the quantity being
In this regard,

sameness of amount of two simultaneously distinct object

configurations

indeed presents

a more formidable problem and

decreases the probability of solutions grounded in perception
and semi logic.
digm no

For TGE the crux is that in the Cl para 

I/R operations

need be postulated for a solution,

the expected performance
to "conserve."
status of I/R,

of even a pre-operational child

If one is intending

is

to assess the cognitive

Cl is certainly inadequate to the objective.

Should it be that Cl and TS are necessary and,
even just,

and

sufficient for CE,

then the

or

role of conservation
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and

I/R in TGE would require considerable modification.

Reversibility would then be without
task and relegated,

at best,

its primary assessment

to excess theoretical baggage.

The implicit revision of TGE that would be necessitated
the establishment of the T5 model can
Elkind

and 5choenfeld

by

be seen in a quote from

(1972),

Identity conservation is not truly quantitative and
involves only figurative perceptual process (i.e.,
global quant ity judgments comparable to those used when
a child judges a cluster of 10 pennies as more than a
cluster of 6 because of the perceptual impression of
numerosity).
Equivalence conservation in contrast,
requires the deductive processes made possible by concrete
operations [p. 532].
For TGE the important feature of the concrete o p e r a 
tions evidenced by CE is reversibility.
is perceptually based,

1

Elkind owns that Cl

requiring no such logical operations,

and proposes that the harbinger of the concrete operational
period is a syllogistic reasoning
model,

ability

a CI-CE decalage is predicated

(TS).

Also,

in T5

upon the different

number of stimulus objects in the two paradigms and not on
the differential concreteness

of the configural disparity.

The proposal should be interpreted

as a radical departure

from TGE.
Though the Elkind hypothesis
the Group model,

implicitly discounts

it is not without precedent and does have

The perceptual base could be a selective attention
to the volumetric physical invariant in the conservation
•task.
This mode of solution, if it does exist, would be
much more likely in a paradigm where the initial conf ig ura 
tion of the transformed object is no longer visible--CI or
CEI\I— and the disparity between the heights and diameter left
to a remembered image.
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some roots in formal logic.

Copi

(1954)

in describing the

identity relation says:
It is intuitively obvious that the relation of identity
(symbolized by "
"I is transitive, symmetrical and
totally r e f l e x i v e J . . . All of these are immediate
consequences of the definition of identity contained in
Leibniz's principle of Identity of Indi sce rni ble s; x=y
if and only if every property of x is a property of y
and conversely [p. 149].
The identity relation described by Copi is not the identity
operation,

I, previously discussed with reference to TGE and

the Group concept.

The reflexive and symmetrical properties

may be an intuitively obvious component of the identity
relation for even young children,

but the obviousness

transitivity is certainly doubtful and,
not the case at all.

Elkind

of its

in psychological fact,

is quite correct if he assumes

that the young child needs to develop a transitivity op era 
tion and essentially construct
identity relation.

it as a property of the above

That is to say,

transitivity is not

obvious.
However,

the identity relationship between the

quantity attribute of B and B*,
ceived,

must

as it is not directly per 

itself be constructed,

and cannot be assumed to

be rigorously extant in a child who simply pronounces B = B*
in a Cl task.

That is,

the quantitative identity of B and B*

needs a logical justification before
cluded.

it can be validly c o n 

The way to a logical verification of the quantitative
2

Transitive; for entities A, B, and C, if A = B and
B = C then A = C.
Symmetrical; for entities A, and B if A =
B then B = A.
Reflexive; for entity A, it holds that A = A.
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identity relation between B and B*,

according to TGE,

through operations of I/R.

given a quantitative

identity,

Indeed,

is

it may still be necessary to apply a T5 operation

to solve CE,

but it should not be assumed that a child is

enpowered with the rigor of Leibniz's principle of the
Identity of I n d i s c e r n i b l e s .

It must be demonstrated that a

child is applying an identity relationship to a particular
abstract property,

and the Cl paradigm does not provide for

this assessment but only for the identicalness of stuff.
A power of the identity relation,

once it is e s t a b 

lished between entities and their salient a t t r i b u t e (s ), is
that we can infer— from a first premise A = B and any other
proposition

(premise)

containing the symbol B — as valid con 

clusion any proposition that obtains from replacing
instance of B in the second premise by the symbol A.
would be the pattern of a proof of A = B*,
relation,

an
Such

via the identity

from the first premise A = B and the second B = B*

— the instance of B in the second premise being replaced by
A to yield the conclusion

A = B*.

The point is that iden ti 

ties that are not perceptually based must be logically con 
structed

and arrival

at the premise B = B* is not a n e c e s 

sity and must be rigorously ascertained by the child through
some additional logical operation,

such as reversibility.

The global identity sufficient to solve Cl that
Elkind talks of gives
credit for divining

the child,

but on an a priori basis,

Leibniz's principle whereas TGE would

require that this powerful notion must be validated through
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less

inclusive logical principles.

A rather precise analogy

of the psychological development of cognitive

structure and

a formal development of a logical-mathematical
apparently what Piaget intends,

system is

and to that end Cl + TS = CE

is an ill means.

Past Research on the

Identity-

Equivalence Decalage
Most of the previous
within object

(identity)

conservation tasks.
5cholnick,

1 970;

investigations have centered on

vs between object

Three studies

and Gruen

(Hooper,

Elkind &. Schoenfeld,

dence in support of a decalage,
(1970)

and Murray

(equivalence)
1969;

1 972)

have found

while Teets

(1970)

Schwartz &

(1968),

evi

Northman

found no differential

success for identity over equivalence problems.
A common feature of all those studies failing to find
the decalage was the use of subjects who were

essentially

concrete operational regarding conservation.

Elkind and

5choenfeld

(1972)

accounted for these

failuresby noting that,

Identity conservation can be arrived at on the basis of
pre-operational mental structure, whereas equivalence
conservation requires both the pre-operational structures
and the concrete operations that develop at about the
ages of 6 or 7 . . . .
In other words the differential
performance should hold for pre-operational children but
not for concrete operational children [p. 53□].
Although their conclusion
obviously true,

regarding differential success

there is some considerable

is

question as to

whether concrete operations in general develop at about the
"age of 6 or 7" or if many of the specific performances in
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the above cited research can be properly called successful.
Schwartz

and Scholnick

of stimulus factors
discontinuous

(1970)

investigated the role

and logical judgment in conservation of

quantity and did find the decalage.

Equal

amounts of candy were compared where the relative diameters
of two glass containers were identical or different.
each diameter relationship level,
were employed

(direct comparison

yielded six separate tasks.

Within

three types of judgments
(CD),

There were

Cl and CE) which
seven distinct tasks

in all and these were found to form a Guttman scale implying
that the tasks measure a single process
difficulty.
eter,

along a continuum of

When the two containers were of different di a m 

the order of difficulty was CI4. C E < CD.

shown in Table 2.2.

The data is

CD involved a judgment when both the

diameter and height of candy in each beaker was different
(amounts equal)

and it was the most difficult task.

there is no sufficient
cognitive

skills

sensory,

immediate post experience or

(unless one can calculate pyrosities and

volumes by mere inspection)
response,

In CD

that provides for a correct

and it was not surprising

that the illusion of

inequality caused most children to respond incorrectly.
A similar direct comparison,

CD', where the beakers

were of different diameters but the candy of equal height in
each

(i.e.,

unequal amounts)

(percent passed = 30)
course,

elicited more correct judgments

than either CE or CD.

The CD'

task,

of

has a logical solution that e n tai ls — if not explicitly

then some more simple variation of— a compensation operation.
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TABLE 2.2

MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE:
SCHOLNICK

Task

SCHWARTZ AND

(1970)

Mean Correct Responses

Percent

Passes

Cl

2.75

47.5

CD'

2.08

30.0

CE
CD

1 .02
.42

15.0
2.5
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The child need not consider the two dimensions

(height and

diameter)

simultaneously as variables in CD'--the heights

equated.

The child can either discount the height or simply

ignore it,

and attend

are

to only the diameter or perceptual bulk

which is perfectly correlated with amount.

It could be

expected that CD', which involves no transformation and only
one variable

dimension,

would

also be an easier task than

Cl but this was not the case.
consistent with TEE,

This implies,

that a compensation operation is unneces

sary for correct performance on Cl.
(Bruner,

1966;

and is perfectly

Beilin,

1969)

Some previous

studies

have similarly suggested that

success on Cl is not necessarily achieved through a co mp en sa 
tion operation but perhaps through less logically sophisticated
operations

(simple identity)

coupled with

an a priori belief

that the observed transformation will be irrelevant to the
quantity.
Elkind

and Schoenfeld

in four year old children

(1972)

found a CI-CE decalage

(mean = 53 months)

ences for a six year old group

but no di ff e r 

(mean = 75 months).

The two

samples of four and six year olds were tested in a repeated
measures design across Cl and CE for conservation
continuous quantity,

mass and length.

paradigm interaction was as expected

of number,

The resultant

age by

since the older group

performed equally well in the two paradigms while for the
four year olds,

CE was significantly more difficult than Cl.

Some very specific statements were made which appear not to
be warranted by the Elkind

and Schoenfeld data and these are
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discussed extensively in Section
vation.

III.2 on fortuitous con se r

At present it is sufficient to note that

ferential performances

for Cl and

the d i f 

CE in the above two studies

could have been due to the presence of the concrete

conflict

or the between object comparison in CE--both of which ob st a
cles are absent in CI--and that such

a decalage is entirely

commensurate with TGE.
The study by Murray
graders

(1970)

used first and second

in conservation of number problems

The procedure

for Cl and CE.

incorporated three trials within a paradigm,

and required only a judgment response where two of three
correct was scored as pass.
probability of a correct

If it is assumed that the

response

by chance

the binomial expansion applied tothe three
probability of a child

alone is 1/2 and
trial set,

the

scaring exactly two hits is 3/8,

that for exactly three hits is 1/8,

and

thus the pro ba bi li ty

at least two correct is 3/8 + 1/8 = 1/2.

.

of

Murray did not find

the decalage but his results are equivocal because the c r i 
terion he employed cannot discriminate between a chance or
comprehension-based performance.

Also the subjects were six

and seven years old and quite possibly able to solve CE for
number,

as Murray's data did indicate.
Most notable among the studies failing to find

decalage is that by Northman and Gruen
second and third graders

(mean = 8 years)

sures design across paradigms
falsification.

(1970).

a

They used

in a repeated m e a 

and were mindful of memory

The usual CE paradigm was used but the
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identity task was described as,
E presented 5 with a single container of water 5^
and marked the level of the water on 5] . . . E
then introduced an empty container, V, which was
shaped differently from 5-| . 5 observed E pour the
water from S-] into V [p. 4].
The identity paradigm described above is CIC and not Cl.
Elkind

and Schoenfeld

lage to the advanced

(1972)

attributed

the lack of a deca 

age of the subjects which implied that

they would be concrete operational and therefore able to sue
ceed in both identity and equivalence.

The data from North

man and Gruen is shown in Table 2.3.
Obviously there

is no CIC-CE

decalage,

but more

importantly there is certainly no concrete operational per 
formance on either task.
mous

judgment criterion,

Northman and Gruen used a dichotoas did Murray

(1970),

and on any

given trial within a paradigm the expected frequency of Pass
= Fail = 1 5 .

The largest

chi square value calculated

given performance is for CIC in trial
indicating

6 (X

= 2.1 , £

on a
4. .20)

that none of the twelve performances were beyond

chance expectations.

There was neither a decalage or con 

crete operational behavior and the latter finding indicates
that the reason

for the lack of differences between the para

digms is not due to the advanced development of the subjects
A more

likely explanation for the results is that the per

formances were not operatory and the lack of differences
due to the presence of the concrete conflict in both pa r a 
digms.

This suggests that a CI-CE decalage

should be att ri b

uted to the differential conflict and not to the difference
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TABLE 2.3

THE

NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO PA55ED OR FAILED EACH KIND

OF CONSERVATION TASK ON THE SIX TRIALS,
AND GRUEN

1

CIC

2

CE

CIC

(1970)

3

CE

CIC

NORTHMAN

4

CE

CIC

5

CE

CIC

6

CE

CIC

CE

Pass

14

16

14

1B

14

17

16

14

17

15

19

15

Fail

16

14

16

12

16

13

14

16

13

15

11

15

TABLE 2.4

NUMBER OF SUBJECT5 PASSING
CONDITION:

HOOPER

Cl

6 years

7 years

B years

IN EACH

(1969)

CEN

1

CE

Male

5

F emale

1

1

0

Male

5

4

4

Female

4

2

3

Male

5

5

6

Female

4

3

1

0
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in the number of stimulus objects in the two paradigms.
Hooper

(1969)

decalage using Cl,

explored the identity equivalence

CE,

and CEN paradigms.

The content was

discontinuous quantity and the criterion was a correct ju d g 
ment plus adequate verbal explanation on two of three trials.
CEN was used as an equivalence task that was said to be
"comparable to the identity conservation task

format in

terms of memory requirements and perceptual cues presented
to the 5 [p. 237]."

Hooper predicted

that since the two

equivalence tasks shared the hypothetical logical deduction
sequence there would
but as Cl requires

be no differential success between them,

no T5 it will be less difficult than CE

and CEN.
Eighteen males

and eighteen females

age levels were used:

kindergarten

grade

and second grade

(mean = 7 years)

There were six subjects
age level.

of each

at each of three

(mean = 6 years),

first

(mean = 9 years).

sex in each paradigm at each

The number of subjects in each cell who passed

is shown in Table 2.4.
Collapsing across
between CE and CEN,

age levels no difference was found

but a significant difference between

and the combined equivalence paradigms did result
£

< .05).

Although there was no significant

interaction it was reported

(X

2

Cl

= 5.353,

paradigm x age

that the identity-equivalence

(combined) decalage was most pronounced at the lower age level
(X

= 8.02, £ < .01).

Hooper neglected to report that

collapsed across age levels the CI-CEN decalage was not
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significant

(X

2

= 3.6, £ .£ .01)

far the kindergarten children

nor was it E v e n

(X

2

= 2.125, £

significant
.20,

Yates

c o r r e c t i o n ).
In discounting
(1970)

remarked that

Hooper's reported

findings,

Murray

"the differences in number of subjects

conserving between identity and equivalence conditions were
quite

small

[p. 291]."

The differences were small but a

more ruinous criticism is that although,
age,

overall and at each

CE and CEN were of comparable difficulty,

so too were

Cl and CEN— as noted above but ignored by Hooper.
results an identity-equivalence decalage cannot
because Cl,
CEN,

an identity paradigm, was

an equivalence paradigm.

transitivity,
the less,

if CEN = CE,

be claimed

not more facile than

Furthermore,

and Cl = CEN,

by the logic of

then Cl = CE.

statistically it was true that C I < CE

unreported by Hooper)

With such

None

(also

and Cl <£. C E N / C E , which makes for a c o n 

tradiction and some confusion regards the

identity-equivalence

issue.
Hooper's reasoning was that if there was no decalage
between CEN and CE, but one between
vided that Cl has all the solution
the deductive

Cl and CEN/ CE— and p r o 
features of CEN except

argument--then the CI-CEN/CE decalage must be

due to the equivalency paradigms'

need for the

His argument is predicated

upon:

the equation of CE and CEN

on syllogism requirements,

the equation of Cl and CEN on

remembered

image requirements,

syllogism

(T5).

and a CI-CEN decalage based

on the T5 requirement in CEN but not in Cl.

The final two
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points in the predication set are of course c o n t r a d i c t o r y »
the latter predicts a CI-CEN decalage

and the former pr e 

dicts no such decalage.
The resolution of the contradiction in predicted
outcomes should come from the experimental results which
were no CI-CEIM decalage,
indicates

but a CI-CE decalage,

all of which

that the role of T5 is minimal and the observed

decalage is due to the differences on the conflict between
CE and Cl.

Hooper concluded otherwise.

decalage for CEN-CE,

He reported,

but one for CI-CEN/CE,

no

and laid this

difference to a TS requirement for the equivalency p a r a 
digms .
As it was true that no CE-CEN decalage was found —
these two differ on conflict--and a CI-CEN/CE difference was
observed,

it was not wholly improper to decide that the

decalage was due to the object difference and commensurate
TS requirement.

But impropriety is avoided only if one ignores

that also there was no CI-CEN decalage.

With this last

of the results there are two conclusions

possible--depending

on which non decalage

is empha s i z e d — which

fact

renders the f ind

ings highly equivocal but rather interesting too.

Formalization of the Study Hypothesis
The identity-equivalence decalage issue has a number
of components

that are not without consequence for TGE.

The

literature of TGE and the research reviewed here suggest that
the label

"identity-equivalence decalage"

as it regards within

vs between object paradigms is fraught with confusion.

There

47

are four paradigms,
lence,

two at each level of identity and equiva

and these pairs can be differentiated

according to

whether the illusion of inequality is based on a concrete
percept or a remembered
pertaining

image of it.

A numbe'r of questions

to the general developmental sequence of the para

digms are apparent.

Specifically it should

be asked of the

paradigms:
1.

What is the hierarchy of difficulty?

2.

What age range(s)

3.

What

pertains to what

hierarchy?

aspects of the paradigms contribute to any observed

hierarchy?
4.

What cognitive structure may be sufficient for one p ar a
digm but not for another?

5.

Is one paradigm ability nested within another,

e.g.,

Cl + TS = CE?
One aspect of equivalence paradigms

that has not been

explored is the role of recall of the initial e q u ality— not
configuration.

Northman and Gruen

(1970)

did point out that

the recall step is parcel to a TS model of CE,
is a crucial premise in the deduction sequence.
(1964,

1969)

requirement

has often cautioned investigators

5medslund
on the memory

in the study of mental processes and Piaget

in discussing assessment of transitivity
he

in that A = B

(the child)

has stated:

(1968)

"Finally

is asked whether or not A = C, after being

remind ed of the equalities A = B and B = C [p.

123]."

Although memory is a factor in any problem-solving process,
it is here considered

not to be a unique component of any
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particular mental construct or structure,

but a general

information retrieval process to be used over and over again
across tasks.
Other things being equal,

it is suggested that there

are essentially three empirical obstacles which,

depending

upon their relative weightings and combinations,

will c o n 

tribute to a hierarchy of difficulty in the conservation
paradigms.
crete),

The three factors are:

Object

Recall cue).

(Within,

Between)

The Conflict

Conflict

and Memory

(Imagery,

Co n 

(Recall cue,

No

and Object factors are pertinent

to all the paradigms but the recall strictly involves only
the Between object cases,

since there is no

tion to recall for within tasks.

initial r e l a 

A tentative ordinal w e i g h t 

ing of difficulty for among obstacles is,

Conflict'?’ Object 5

Memory while that for the respective intra-obstacle c o m 
parisons is Concrete ?• Imagery,
applicable,

No Recall ?

A developmental

Between 2 Within and,

where

Recall.
sequence of the paradigms based on

the hypothetical weightings of obstacles

is shown in Table

2.5.

CEN and CE, respec

The Cl and CIC are expected to

tively,

lag

because of the Memory requirement

paradigms.

in the equivalency

But if the tasks are implemented with

assurance that the child does recall

A =

cue)

CE = C I C ^ C E N

then the predicted

hierarchy is

B ’ (i.e.,

the
is given
= Cl,

where the cut off is based on the Conflict ?” Object and
Concrete ? Imagery weightings of obstacles.

a
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TABLE 2.5
HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE OF
CONSERVATION PARADIGM5

Hierarchy

Obstacles

Paradigm

Last

First

CE

Concrete,

Between,

CIC

Concrete,

Within

CEN

Imagery,

Between,

Cl

Imagery,

Within

Demonstration

Memory

Memory

of the viability of the above deve l o p 

mental sequence is the basic objective of this dissertation.
Central to the hierarchy is the relative weighting of o bsta
cles and this too is part of the primary objective.

Addi

tional inquires,

subsidiary to the hypothetical d e v e l o p 

mental sequence,

pertain to the scoring criterion

and esp e 

cially to the problem of chance or fortuitious correct p e r 
formances.

The multiplicity of scoring techniques

and their

amenability to estimation of the probability that correct
solutions could have occurred without comprehension appears
to have interesting possibilities and is much discussed in
the chapter on Methodology.

50

SECTION

III

METHODOLOGY

The Empirical Study

Basic Design
Ninety-six children from 4.5 to 6.5 years of age
were selected from a nursery school/kindergarten and day care
center in the Durham,

New Hampshire area.

Overall age and

sex statistics of the sample are shown in Table 3.1.
An objective,

largely achieved,

subjectsinto the eight
uniform distribution
was conceived

in the placement of

(n = 12 ) experimental groups was a

of age and sex.

as a four factor

repeated measures on Factor

The basic experiment

(2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ) design with

III.

The independent variables

are indicated in Table 3.2 and the cell array with the
repeated measure factor indicated is shown in Figure 3.1.
The contents employed were,

in the conservation paradigms,

discontinuous

and continuous

quantity

(DQ)

quantity

(CQ).

Within each Memory status condition a child successively
received

a DQ and a CQ problem,

in all.

The content was altered on each trial,

the four possible orderings was:
No Recall

(DQ),

No Recall

(CQ).

and there were four trials

Recall

(DQ),

e.g.,
Recall

one of
(CQ),
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TABLE 3.1

AGE AND 5EX DATA FDR THE SAMPLE

T otal

96

Females

44

Males

52

Mean Age

Age Range

Age Std.

65.2 mths 33-74 mths

Dev.

5.91

TABLE 3.2

DESIGNATION OF FACTORS

Factor Number

I

IN THE BASIC DESIGN

Name

Object status

Levels

(1 ) - Within
(2 ) = Between

II

Conflict status

(1 ) = Concrete
(2 ) = Imagery

III

Memory status

(1 ) = Recall cue
(2 ) = No Recall cue

IV

Sequence of recall
cue

(1 ) = Recall first
(2 ) = Recall second
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Within

Concrete

Recall
Sequence

1
Sequence

2

No

Between Obiect

Ob iect

Imaqe

Recall

Concrete

No

Recall

No

Imaqe

Recall

Group 1

3

5

7

Group 2

4

6

8

Fig.

3.1.

Cell array in the basic design.

No
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Pretest

Young children do not always have a firm u n d e r 
standing

of the specificity of relational terms such

'more ,1 'less'
Kingsley,

and

1967).

childrens'

'same'

(Griffin et a l . , 1 967;

as

Hall &.

Hence a pretest was employed to gauge the

comprehension

of these particular quantifiers

also to allow the children to became

a bit familiar with the

materials

and general mode of comparisons that they would

encounter

in the experimental situations.

Each
(3" x 3.5")

child

had before him three identical cylindrical

drinking glasses,

each containing

amount

identical

glass which was previously filled to the i n t e r 

amount and asked

with replacement,
'less'

of yellow water.

an obviously

different

mediate

He was then given a fourth

to select from the three,in

a glass having the

than his glass.

terms was

and

'same"

turn and

amount,'more'

and

One of the six possible orderings of

randomly assigned to each

subject.

The same p r o 

cedure was followed for a DQ pretest except glasses were
filled with short grained
reversed.

No deli b e r a t e

sequent questioning
response,

feedback was given but if upon sub

a child wished to renege on a previous

he was allowed to do so.

of each child,
response,

raw rice and the order of the terms

5ix questions were asked

where zero points were given

for an incorrect

and one point for a correct response.

The pretest

score was used as a covariate in subsequent analyses of the
results.
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Materials
Standard materials were utilized for each of the two
content

areas.

For between object tasks

identical cylindrical
taller and slimmer

glasses

(2.375"

(2.75" x 4.625")

x 5.75")

impressions of

'fullness'

essentially equivalent.

CE)

two

and a third

one were used.

of the former volume to the latter is 1
bulk

(CEN,

.06 and

The ratio

the gross or

for the two recepticles

is

This simple control should mitigate

any tendency to judge an amount different because its c o n 
tainer has mare or less of its bulk occupied than the other.
The distances from the top of the glasses to the level of
material

is mathematically equal when the stouter glass is

filled to 71.3 percent of its height.
to keep these distances

Some effort was made

equal as another control against di f 

ferential fullness which might be defined by the child as
"how close to the top of the glass."
volumetric fullness
stant,

5ince the relative

and distance from the top are nearly co n 

the salient perceptual cue for the conflict,

should be restricted primarily to discrepancies
i.e.,

then,

in height,

distance from the base.
For DQ the stout glasses were about

(height)

10 percent

filled with small white pea beans or black beans;

a different

color for each memory-status condition.

The CQ

tasks were run with identical glasses and shape relations
in DQ,

as

except that red and green colored water was used.

Different colors were used to provide the child with

a pr e 
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text for having a second trial on the same content.
example,

in the l\lo Recall DQ,

CQ trials,

For

a child might

respectively get white beans and red water while in the
Recall situation
respectively.

he would receive black

The concrete perceptual

beans and green water
cue was eliminated in

the CEN problems by placing a large cylindrical can over one
of the stout glasses after the initial comparison and just
prior to the transformation of the material
stout

from the second

glass to the slim one.
The Within Object tasks

of the stout

glasses

Object conditions.

(Cl,

CIC)

employed only one

and the same slim one as in the Between
Also the same beans,

orderings were used.

water and trial

In order to provide a concrete p e r 

ceptual cue for the CIC problems the original height of the
material was marked by placing a rubber band on the stouter
glass prior to the transformation.

Procedures
The specific procedures
will be outlined in this

for each of the paradigms

section.

The CE paradigm was run as

usual except for a slight alteration on certain of the trials
in order to allow for the modified Elkind scoring technique.
The two stout glasses,

A and B, were previously filled to

the same height and the child asked:
of water to drink in this glass
there is in this glass?"
child said

"Is there the same amount

(experimenter points to A) as

(experimenter points to B).

"no," he was invited

If the

to fill the smaller amount
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(his choice)

with water from a carafe until he was satisfied

that the amounts were

exactly the same.

in glass B was poured

into the slim glass

asked,
B*)

Then the material
(B*)

"Is there the same amount to drink here

as in this glass

amount here

(pointing to A),

(pointing to B*)

and the child
(pointing to

or is there a different

than in here

(painting to A)?"

The phrasing is a bit awkward grammatically,

but it is s p e 

cific and unambiguous in conjunction with the synchronous
pointing gestures.

After his judgment the child was asked

"Why do you think so?"

If,

after an incorrect judgment,

child neglected to indicate more or less,

the

he was simply asked,

"which is more to drink?"
□n the second problem within each Memory condition
the child made an incorrect judgment,
this

(point to B*)

back into here

there be the same amount in here
here

he was asked,

(point to B),
(still pointing

"If I put

then will
to B)

as

(point to A) or will they be different amounts?"

question could have been never,
subject.

if

This

once or twice asked of each

The CEN paradigm was run in exactly the same manner

as CE except that object A was covered
transformed to B*.
question,

In the Recall condition,

after the first

the cue was provided by asking the child

remember that these two glasses
same amount before
of memory,

just before B was

I poured?"

"do you

(point to A and B) were the
If the child indicated

a lapse

he was verbally reminded of the original status.

In the CIC problems the child was shown the p r e 
viously filled stout glass

(B) and he watched while the
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e xp erimenter placed an elastic band at the height of the
material.

The child was invited to judge the match-up of

height and elastic.

He was also allowed to modify the

elastic's position if he believed the match to be imprecise.
Then the experimenter poured the contents of B into the slim
glass B* and asked,
(pointing to B*)

"Is there the same amount to drink

as there was before

there a different amount
child was asked,
judgment

now?"

(pointing to B),

After his judgment,

"Why do you think

so?"

here
or is

the

Upon an incorrect

on the second trial within each Memory condition,

the child was asked,

"Will i t

be the same amount

as before if

I put it back in here

(painting to B)

than it was before?"

After the transformation and first

question,

or will it be different

the Recall cue was provided by asking the child,

"Do you remember how much was in here

(point to B) before?"

The Cl problems were run just as in CIC except that there was
no concrete perceptual indicator of the original height of
materials.
□f course the specific wording of the questions

asked

is something of an ideal that is difficult to realize in
practice unless a robot device
employed.

(programmed procedure)

is

One thing in the actual procedure that could be

controlled was the spoken order of "same" and
this was simply alternated

such that within

"different"

subjectseach of

these terms was uttered first in two of the four p r o b l e m s —
once in each Memory condition.

and
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5coring
There is considerable
Brainerd,
lund,

1973;

1963)

Gruen,

1966;

discussion

(Braine,

Limber & Chiseri,

1959,

1974;

1964;

5meds-

as to whet h e r a simple judgment or a judgment

plus a verbal justification are proper criterion for Piagetian
and other tasks assessing mental
the importance of incorporating

processes.

Methodologically

verbal explanations

on its utility as a defense against certain sources
positive
or Type

and false negative diagnostics.

centers
of false

The false negative

II error can arise because of inattentiveness,

mis

interpretation of the question and a host of common problems
encountered when assessing

cognitive abilities

1969).

a correct judgment can arise due

On the other hand,

to entirely fortuitous

factors

(e.g.,

a procedural bias that

spawns an irrelevant hypothesis which yields
ment,

or simple

important

guessing)

factors.

a correct j u d g 

or because of theoretically

The latter Type

theoretical import too,

(Smedslund,

I error situation

and is especially potent for many of

Piaget's concerns where there

are multiple

s t ructures— perhaps

some more primitive than others--postulated within
that can account for a correct
rather than deductive

is of

judgment.

solutions,

the theory

Imagery solutions,

to transitivity problems

are

a good example.

Also an explanation can provide insight as

to the probable

solution mechanism employed or what has been

referred to by B r a i n e r d (1973)

as the

'nature'

of structure.
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The major argument against the use of verbal
tions is that the judgment plus verbal
tasks are theoretically--and

expl a n a 

successes in Piagetian

empirically

(Gruen,

1965)— a

proper subset of the judgment-only criterion and thus i n d u c 
tive of false negative diagnostics.
ment,

This theoretical a r g u 

most recently fostered by Brainerd

not unreasonable

(1973),

rests on the

notion that a child might be applying the

mental operations of interest but simply unable to verbalize
it;

i.e.,

the appropriate linguistic skills lag the o p e r a 

tional ability.
The choice of criteria is not a mean
analysis of the problem,

Gruen

(1966)

issue.

correctly noted that the

selection should be a function of the theoretical
involved

and that verbal explanations

In his

nations

appear commensurate

with TGE whereas the judgment criterion is more amenable
theories like that of Bruner

(1964,

1966).

to

For the present

study the preferred criterion is the judgment plus verbal
criterion although

the data will also be analyzed

simple judgment and a modified Elkind
comprehensive
requirement

A more

justification for the preference of the verbal

is presented in Limber and Chiseri

The explanation
1.

criterion.

under a

(1974).

criterion was primarily invoked to:

Guard against false positive diagnostics due to i r r e l e 
vant

cues/hypotheses,

response

set

(it's always the same),

pure g u e s s , e t c .;
2.

Guard against false negative diagnostics due to lack of
attention or comprehension of the question(s);
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3.

Indicate the bases of incorrect judgments.

The criterion was very liberal,

and generally any logical

explanation pertinent to the task
is logical but irrelevant)

(e.g.,

"because 2 + 2 = 4,"

was regarded as sufficient.

verbal rationale offered by a child was transcribed
ately after each trial,and

The

immedi

decisions as to the acceptability

of the response were independently made later by two judges
who had

no

judgments,

knowledge of the subject's
experimental condition,

number of correct

or personal data.

The inclusion of the explanation criterion was not
to specifically indicate the

"nature" of the

underlying

structure or reveal a rigorous understanding of certain
principles that support notions of conservation.
verbal response was intended to provide

Rather,

the

evidence that a

child's belief in the equality was grounded in principles
that are relevant to,
ment.

and logically implicated by his judg

Given that a correct judgment was made,

following argument categories were acceptable:
reciprocity,
subtractions,

inversion,

previous equality,

irrelevancy of the observed

any of the
compensation/

no additions or
transformation,

and identicalness of material.
After each transformation,
question pertinent to the paradigm.
a correct response

then,

In the judgment scoring

received one point and an incorrect

response zero points.
criterion is,

the child was asked the

The range of scores for the judgment

0 to 4.

On each trial the child was

asked to give a verbal rationale for his judgment and the
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judgment/explanation scoring -proceeded as follows:
judgment = 0 , correct
2.

judgment = 2 , acceptable explanation =

A subject could earn

as many as

the range of scores is 0
A modified
further discussed

4

points per trial, and

to 16.

Elkind criterion was

also used,

A correct judgment on

the conservation question received 3 points.
trial within each Memory condition,

pouring B* back

and is

in the section on Fortuitious Performance

but will be briefly previewed here.

rect judgment,

incorrect

On the second

if he had made an i ncor

the child

was

asked to judge the outcome of

into B.

If,

in CEN or CE,

he said that the

two amounts will again be the same or if, in Cl or CIC,
declared the amount will
he received 2 points,

he

be restored to its original status,

whereas if he believed the amounts

would remain different,

only 1 point was given.

Thus

a

range of 2 to 12 points is possible.
There is an infinity of ways to assign weights to
the judgment and verbal responses,

but in light of the co n 

troversy and dearth of research using
of scoring procedures,

equal weights will be assumed.

interval level of measurement
vation,"

systematic manipulation
The

implies a "continuum of co n s e r 

and the equal weights in the judgment/explanation

criterion requires that the distance between an incorrect
judgment and a correct judgment is equal to the distance
between a correct
nation.

judgment and a correct judgment plus e xpla
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All the scoring procedures
simultaneously and each

are of course executed

allows the data to be meaningfully

interpreted at a nominal or interval level of measurement.
If conservation
behavior,

is viewed as an

'all or none'

(pass or fail)

then a predesignated performance level can be

applied to each subject and the correspondent classification
made.

The four trial point totals for a pass and the r e s 

pective significance levels

are shown in Table 3.3.

TABLE 3.3

MINIMUM LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE

FOR A PASS

CLASSIFICATION AND ASSOCIATED
FORTUITOUS PROBABILITY

Performance

Criterion

Probability

Judgment

4 correct = 4 points

£ = .0625

Judge/Explain

4 correct = 16 points

£ <

.0625

Elkind

combination

£ £

*125

11 points

The probabilities in Table 3.3 are based on the assumption
that a fortuitous correct judgment on any given trial is
equally likely as an incorrect judgment and derived from the
appropriate
III.2).

fortuitous probability function

(see Section

The resultant data was analyzed with non-parametric

techniques for the "all or none"

approach and by various
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parametric procedures

under the "continuum of conservation"

(interval level data)

assumption.

The following two subsections of Methodology,
Fortuitous Performance

and Levels of Measurement,

entitled

are not

entirely necessary for an appreciation of the section on
Results.

As the fortuitous models and measurement levels are

believed to be properly germane to methodology,

and cannot be

adequately discussed without reference to the scoring p r o 
cedures used in the experiment,

their treatment has been

deferred to this point in the text.
the Elkind and Schoenfeld

(1972)

In the next subsection

study is the basis for an

example of construction and application of a probability
distribution of fortuitous performance.
example,

the models

Subsequent to the

for the judgment and Elkind criteria used

in the present study are derived.

The Levels of Measurement

discussion briefly reviews some of the requirements

and

implications of nominal and interval data.

Fortuitous

Performance

In the absence of a spontaneous verbal explanation as
parcel to the criteria for a correct response,

fortuitous

conservation can be a serious deterrent for the researcher
who wishes to make inferences beyond his data.

Fortuitous

conservation is intended to represent that situation where a
child simply guesses or selects— either through whimsy or
because of cues sporadically engendered by the experimenter—
an available response which happens to be the correct one.
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Where only simple judgment is employed as the criterion for
conservation,

it would

be desirable to have a theoretical

model of fortuitous conservation to guard against subjects
being erroneously classified

as conservers.

For example,

if

the probability of a mindless correct judgment on any given
task can be judiciously 'e s t i m a t e d , a binomial expansion could
then be applied to derive a theoretical sampling distribution
of fortuitous conservation.
At its most rudimentary level the probability of a
fortuitous correct

judgment extant in the population depends

upon the number of alternative judgments that might be rea
sonably invoked in the conservation
first approximation might
nizable

A

find that there are three r ecog

and mutually exclusive

comparison of quantities:

assessment paradigm.

response categories for the

(1) More,

(2)

Less,

and

(3)

Same.

It could then, be reasonably argued that the chance probability
of each

response category is 1/3 and that the likelihood of a

fortuitous correct response is 1/3
fortuitous incorrect response
2/3.

(Same),

is 1/3

while that for a

(More)

This would be an accurate analysis if,

+ 1/3

(Less)

=

for example,

to

obtain his judgment,a subject were to pick from a container
one of three slips of paper each marked with
response category.

But

a different

a subject seeking a solution to the

conservation problem does not operate in this manner, and there
is good reason to expect that the number of alternative
response categories effectively available

is two— or at

least problematically between two and three.

In the lower
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limit this would render the probability of a fortuitous correct
response equal to 1/2 and is tantamount to characterizing the
subject's task as making a decision between

response c a t e 

gories Different and S a m e .
Flavell

(1963)

has noted that the common denominator

among non-conservers consists of a unidimensional,

perceptual

centration approach to problems of quantity judgment,
dimension which is centered depending

the

upon the particulars

of the perceptual configuration at hand.

The empirical

essence of Piaget's conservation problems is the perceptual
illusion of disparate

quantities

after the so-called

tative transformation of one of the objects.

quali

The conflict

or illusion regarding the apparent inequality of amount is
effected because the child centers on a single dimension or
perceptual attribute and ignores the other(s).

For example,

in tasks on discontinuous and continuous quantity,

an incor

rect response stems from the child's inclination to invariably
correlate height with

amount even though

the diameters of the

containers being compared are different.
Piaget

(1967)

empirically confirmed

has demo n s t r a t e d — and this writer has
it to his own satisfaction--that

children are essentially natural conservers,

expecting the

amounts to remain equal but reneging on their expectation
upon observation of the post-transformation perceptual c o n 
figuration.

This writer,

and Miller et a l . (1973),

have

documented that a given illusion prompts the same kind of
incorrect response from transitional and non-conservers.
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Thus,

if a child is unable

to logically or systematically

resolve the problem yet is required to give an answer,
are realistically two alternatives open to him:
depending on the illusion,

More or Less,

Same

there
and,

but not both.

The implication of the above is that the probability
of a fortuitous More is not equal to the probability of a
fortuitous

Less and in a given situation one of these l i k e l i 

hoods tends to zero while the other tends to 1/2.
probability of Same,

as defined by 1 - (jg.[Less] + jg^More]),

has as its practical limits 1/3 to 1/2,
albeit compromising,

ment

and a plausible,

estimate would be the midpoint of the

probability interval,
however,

The

i.e., £(Same)

= 5/12.

Alternatively,

if it were known that during the course of an exp e r i 

almost all the incorrect responses are More,

then a

better assignment of fortuitous probabilities would be
jg(Same)

= jg(More)

= 1/2 and ja(Less)

of the parameter is decided upon,
distribution,

once derived

be used to determine

Whatever estimate

the theoretical

sampling

from the binomial expansion,

can

the probability that an observed pe r 

formance is of a fortuitous nature.
from Elkind and 5choenfeld

(1972)

(content areas),

An example,

using data

follows.

The experiment included four
tasks

= 0.0.

separate conservation

each with the possibility of one or

two questions being asked.

If on the first pass the child

responded with an incorrect judgment to the usual c o n s e r v a 
tion question,
back

he was asked,

as it was before?"

"Would it be the same if I put it

Over the four tasks the maximum and
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minimum scores attainable were 12 and 4 respectively.
flow diagram of the questioning

A

and scoring procedure is

shown below in Figure 3.2.

START

SET UP
NEXT
TASK
YES
NO

QUESTION
ANSWERED
"SAME"?

EVENT

SCORE
NO
ALL
FOUR
TASKS
RUN?

YES

POINTS

YES

IS/
QUEST/ION
ANSWERED
"SAME"?

EVENT

SCORE
NO
POINTS

ADD
TOTAL
SCORE

SCORE
POINT

ON
TO
NEXT
KID

Fig. 3.2
Flow diagram of the Elkind
Scoring Procedure.

and Schoenfeld
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Define

event class A where e a c h e v e n t

A^ represents

the number of correct responses on the first pass.
Let:

ja(same)

= 1/2

_g (d i f f e r e n t ) «• 1/2
n = 4
Then:

A.
1
E 1 = (1/2 + 1 / 2 )4 =

1

A~
2

A.,
3

1

Ac
5

event

6

4

1

likelihood

2

3

4

no.

4
□

A.
4

Define event class B where each

event

the number of correct responses onthe second
Let:

_£(same)

correct

represents
pass.

= 1/2
= 1/2

^(different)

m = number of tasks on second pass
Then:

= (1/2 + 1/2)m

Event
p(Acj) = 1/16,

Event
p (A 4 ) = 4/16,

A5 :

where 0

m

4 of 4 correct on first

m = 0 , net score = 4 x 3

A4 :

B.j
=

B^

pass.

= 12 .

3 of 4 correct on first

m = 1, prelim,

E^= (1/2 + 1/ 2 )^

4.

pass,

score = 3 x 3 = 9 .
event

1

1

likelihood

0

1

no. correct

If A and B are independent events, jd(A and B) = ja(A) x ja(B).
ja(A4 and B 1 ) = r ( A 4 )
9 + 1

=10.

x

£.(B.,) = 4/16 x 1/2 = 4/32,

nets
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£(A^

and B 2 ) = £ ( A 4 )

x

£ ( B 2 ) = 4/16 x 1/2 = 4/32,

nets

9 + 2 = 11.
Event A 3 :
js/A^) = 6/16,

2 of 4 correct on first pass.

m = 2 , prelim,
B^

E 2 = (1/2 + 1/ 2)2 =

1
0

= 6.

score = 2 x 3

B^

event

2
1

1

likelihood

2

no.

correct

£_(A2 and

B^ )= 6/16 x 1/4 =

3/32,

nets

£ ( A 2 and

B 2 )= 6/16 x 2/4 =

6/32,

nets 6 + 2

£ ( A^ and

B^) = 6/16 x 1/4 =

3/32,

nets 6 + 2 + 2 = 10.

In the

+ 1=9.

same manner as above the joint probabilities

and respective point totals
A^.

6 + 1 + 1 = 8.

are determined

for events A 2 and

The completed calculations yield the set of all possible

point totals and corresponding probabilities.

Some point

totals can be obtained in more than one way and their net
probability is obtained
of each path.

by simply summing

The resultant probability

distribution function,

the probabilities
function, £(X),

and

£ ( X ), are shown in Table 3.4.

The probability distribution of Table

3.4 represents

a population of scores and effectively defines the p r o b a 
bility that an individual who does not possess a solution,
but is capable of responding dichotomously to the questions,
will net the respective point total.
single individual is sampled,

Alternatively if a

the probability that he will

fortuitously score X or better is equal to /L£(X).

The
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TABLE 3.4

THEORETICAL PROBABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
OF FORTUITOUS CONSERVATION SCORES:
ELKIND AND SCHOENFELD
SCORING

BASED ON

(1972)

PROCEDURE

X

£(X)

I r (X)

4

.0039

1.0000

5

.01 57

.9961

6

.0547

.9804

7

.1 094

.9257

8

.1914

.81 63

9

.21 87

.6249

10

.21 87

.4062

11

.1 250

.1 875

12

.0625

.0625

^

= 9,

CT2 = 2.751
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distribution
lation,

of means of sample size n, from the above p o p u 

has a mean equal to the population mean and a sampling

2

variance of CT~ /n.

<r 2m

There were 22 subjects in each group so

= 2.75/22 = .125 and the standard error of the mean is

<T” m = .353 .

Although the population is certainly not nor

mally distributed,

the central limit theorem provides that

the distributions of all possible means is normal and with
this knowledge we can determine the probability that the group
means
null

reported by Elkind and Schoenfeld
(or fortuitous)

population of scores.

the six year olds in CE we have:
9.2 - 9/.353 = .565.
null population,

(1972) came from the

Z = X -

For example,

/ (j~m

=

The probability of sampling,

a mean

for

from the

equal to or greater than 9.2 is about

.28 and this is clearly not sufficiently remote to conclude
that the six year olds can solve CE.
The group performance reported by Elkind and Sc h o e n 
feld and the calculated fortuitous probabilities are shown in
Table 3.5.

Both age groups performed better than chance would

dictate on Cl but in CE the six year olds did not exceed
chance expectations

and the four year olds did significantly

worse than chance.

The latter point is interesting

in that

it implies that the younger children were impelled by the pe r 
ceptual cue to judge the quantities as different.

The CI-CE

decalage is clearly apparent since both groups passed Cl but
neither group managed

CE.
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TABLE 3.5

GROUP MEAN PERFORMANCE AND FORTUITOUS
PROBABILITY
SCHOENFELD

FOR ELKIND AND
(1972)

DATA

T ask

Age

5core

Cl

6 years

1 1 .08

5.90

.001

4 years

1 0.52

4.30

.001

6 years

9.20

.56

.280

4 years

6.96

-5.77

.001

CE

Z 5core

£

For preoperational children Elkind and Schoenfeld
predicted:

"identity and conservation

a necessary prerequisite
529],"

to equivalence

and they concluded:

conservation

and be
[p.

"identity but not equivalence

conservation in young children,
lence conservation

should precede

but both identity and eq u i v a 

in older children

[p.

532]."

The reported

difference between the four year old Cl and CE groups,
statistically significant

had

though

and in the predicted direction,

seems not to warrant the express conclusions made in their
paper and certainly not that Cl is a necessary prerequisite
to CE since no unequivocal passing performance in CE
fact demonstrated.

was

in
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The preceding

example demonstrated construction

of a

theoretical distribution which was then applied to group per
formances, but the model can be equally well used to evaluate
the fortuitous extent of an individual performance.
In order to use the binomial it is only necessary
that each of the trials for a single subject be an i n d e p e n 
dent event with a finite set of outcomes having respective
invariant probabilities
are considered

of occurrence.

These probabilities

to be population parameters and must be c o m 

bined in accord with the specific scoring procedure.
descriptive

A

label for the general t e c h n i q u e — that is binomial

model or o t herwise— would be "Stochastic Modeling of Fortuitous
Performance in Problem Solving Tasks"

(Chiseri,

1974).

A model for the judgment criterion will be described
next.

Consider a four trial set of conservation problems

employing a simple judgment criterion where such responses are
interpreted

as a dichotomous

bility of fortuitous

random variable.

If the p r o b a 

success on a given trial is

probability of failure,

£, is 1 - £.

jd,

then the

A subject that is b e h a v 

ing fortuitously on the problems can be expected to achieve
zero to four successes with a set of commensurate p r o b a b i l i 
ties:

with

exactly what probability depends on £_ (and n, the

number of independent trials).

Table 3.6 shows the various

theoretical expectancies over four trials

for three different

values of £.
For each of the distributions of the probability of
a given

score X,

jd(X)

is known as the probability function
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TABLE 3.6

PROBABILITY

AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS

FOR A FOUR TRIAL SET UNDER A
DICHOTOMOUS

JUDGMENT CRITERION

R = 1/3, R = 2/3 R

= 2/5,

£ = 3/5 jo = 1/2 , R = 1/2

Successes
X

R

0

.1 975

1 .000

.1 296

1 .000

.0625

1 .000

1

.3951

.8025

.3456

.8704

.2500

.9375

2

.2963

.4074

.3456

.5248

.3750

.6875

3

.0988

.1111

.1 536

. 1 792

.2500

.31 25

4

.01 23

.01 23

.0256

.0256

.0625

.0625

(X)

rn(x)

£(X)

Tfi(x)

and X E.(X) as the distribution function.
function significance

levels

jo (X)

5L e (X)

From the latter

of performances can be deter-

mined and of course this is what would most interest a
researcher who must decide if a performance was fortuitous
or based upon some comprehension or a meaningful solution to
the problem.
depending

For a given n there is a family of distributions,

upon £,

and three of these are shown in Figure 3 .3 .

Once £ is set the significance level

(one or two tailed)

be read directly from the appropriate curve.

may
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1

£ js.( x )

.

50

.25
1/2

2/5
1/3

□

2

3

4

X

Fig. 3.3.
Graph of distribution function of f o r t u 
itous performance under the judgment criterion.
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START

SET UP
NEXT TRIAL

SCORE 3

YES

CORRECT
RESPONSE?

QUESTION
1

NO
NO

^nd
NO
SCORE 0

TRIALS
RUN?

TRIAL IN
A MEMORY
CONDITION?

YES

YES

QUESTION
SCORE 2

SUM
SCORE

YES

CORRECT
RESPONSE?

2

NO

SCORE 1
END

3.4.
terion.

Flow diagram of the Elkind scoring cri-
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A slightly altered version of the Elkind
feld

(1972)

scoring 'method was used in the present study and

is also amenable to stochastic modeling.
procedure used was described previously
above in Figure

3.4.

The modified Elkind
and is diagrammed

It will be referred

to throughout the

remainder of the text as the Elkind criterion.
criterion,

and S c h o e n 

In the Elkind

on the second trial within a Memory condition,

the

child is asked a second question provided he failed the first.
The following sample calculations will set
the first

and second questions,

mentally dichotomous

jd

= 1/2 for both

since they are both f unda

judgment situations where response c ate

gories same and different

are respectively correct and incor

rect .

Sample

Calculation for Elkind

Criterion

Event class A and B will be used to represent the
first and second questions respectively.
sents the number of correct
where £, = H =

and n = 4.

lihoods are determined

Each event A^ r e p r e 

responses on the first question,
Thus the events and their l ike

from the binomial:
Ag

E.| = (1/2 + 1/2)^ =

1

0

A^

A^

Ag

A^

Event

4

6

4

1

Likelihood

1

2

3

4

No.

Correct

Each event B ^ represents the number of correct r e 
sponses on the second question where ja =
number of second questions,

= 1/2 and m, the

is a function of event A and

whether the child missed question one on a second trial within
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a Memory condition.
cates things a bit,

The determination of B events co m p l i 
and the probability

that a miss on q ues

tion one will occur on the second trial of a Memory pair must
be integrated
mined,

into the joint probabilities.

Once m is d e t e r 

the outcomes for B and their likelihoods are d e t e r 
= (1/2 + 1/ 2 )m , where

mined from the expansion of:
D ^ m i 2.

Event A o :
jd(Aq) = 1/16,
E2

=

jd(Aq

(1/2

+

zero of 4 correct on the first question.
points = 0 , m = 2 .

prelim,

1/2)2

=

1

2

0

1 2

1

^ e l i h o o d

no.

correct

)

x

£.(^g) ~ 1/16 x

1/4 = 1/64,

nets 0 + 1

=2.

js(Ag)

x

jd(B,|) =

1/16 x

1/2 = 2/64,

nets 0 + 3

= 3.

jd(Aq

x

£.(B2 )= 1/16 x

1/2 = 2/64,

nets 0 + 4

= 4.

)

Event A i :

1 of 4 correct on first question.

jd(A.|) = 4/16,

prelim,

points = 3.

values of m:

1 or 2 .

There are two possible

jD(m = 1 ) is the probability that the

success on event A comes on the second trial of a given
Memory condition pair.
event A^

There are four possible outcomes for

and two of them yield m = 1 and two yield m = 2 ,

thus £_(m = 1 ) = p/m = 2 ) = 1/ 2 .
Let
m = 1

a
E2

=

(1/2

+

1/2) 1

1

1

likelihood

0

1

no. correct

=
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£(A^)

x £(m = 1) x jo(Bg) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/16,

3 + 1

= 4.

jd (A 1 )

X

£(m = 1) X £.(B1 ) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/64,

nets

nets

3 + 2 = 5 .
Let
m = 2
E 2 = ( 1/2 + 1/ 2)2 = 1

2 1

0
jd (A.j )

x jo(m = 2) x

3 + 1

=5.

£_(A 1 )

X

1

2

likelihood
no.

correct

£(Bg) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/4

= 2/64,

nets

= 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/64,

nets

x £(m = 2) x £ ( B 2 ) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/4 = 2/64,

nets

£(m = 2) x

3 + 3 = 6 .
£(A^)

3 + 4 = 7 .

Event A 2
£(A^)

= 6/16,

values of m:

’
•

2 of 4 correct on the first question.

prelim,

points = 6 .

D, 1 or 2 .

There are three possible

£( m = 0 ) is the probability that

both successes on event A 2 come on the second trial of each
of the two Memory condition pairs.

The probabilities

for the

values of m can be determined by noting that there are four
trials and they are essentially sampled two at a time.
is, there are exactly

= 4!/2!

x 2! = 6 ways to allocate

two successes across four trials.

One of the six ways yields

m = 0 , four of the ways yields m = 1 (i.e.,
the second of a pair)

That

one success on

and one way gives m = 2 (i.e.,

successes on the second of a pair).

The respective

no
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probabilities are:

1/6,

4/6,

and 1/6.

Let m = 0, there is no second question,
£.(A ^ ) x £.(fn = □) = 6/16 x 1/6 = 4/64,

= 1•

nets 6 + 0 = 6 .

Let m = 1
E2 =

(1/2 + 1/ 2 )1 = 1

1

0
jd(A2

) x

jd(iti

1

likelihood
n o . correct

= 1) x £.(Bj-|) = 6/16 x 4/6 x 1/2 = 8/64,

nets

) x ^(m = 1) x £.(B^ ) = 6/16 x 4/6 x 1/2 = 8/64,

nets

6 + 1 = 7 .
jd(A2

6 + 2 = 8 .
Let m = 2
E 2 = (1/2 + 1/ 2)2

jd(A2 ) x £_(m = 2)

=1

2

1 likelihood

0

1

2

no. correct

x ja(BQ ) = 6/16 x 1/6 x 1/4

= 1/64,

nets

6+2

= 8.

jd(A2 )

x js(m = 2) x £.(B.|) = 6/16 x 1/6 x 2/4 = 2/64,

nets

6 + 3 = 9 .
£_(A2 ) x j3 (m = 2) x jd (B 2 ) = 6/16 x 1/6 x 1/4 = 1 / 6 4 , nets
6 + 4 = 1 0 .

Event A 3 :

3 of 4 correct on the first question.

^-(A 3 ) = 4/16,

prelim,

points = 9.

values of m:

0 or 1 .

There are

allocate three successes

are each 1/ 2 .

4

= 4!/3!

= 4 ways to

across four trials and two of them

yield m = 0 and two give m = 1.
bilities

There are two possible

Thus,

the respective p r o b a 
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Let m = 0, there is no second question,
£(A^)

x £ ( m = 0) = 4/16 x 1/2 = B/64,

= 1•

nets 9 + 0 = 0 .

Let m = 1, there is one second question.
E 2 = (1/2 + 1/ 2)1 =

1

1

likelihood

0

1

no. correct

£(A^)

x jo(m = 1) x £(B|-j) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/64,

9 + 1

= 10.

£ (A ^ ) x £(m = 1) x £ (B ,j ) = 4/16 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 4/16,

nets

nets

9 + 2 = 1 1 .

Event A 4 :
£(A^)

= 1/16,

4 of 4 correct on the first question.

nets 12 , there are no second questions.

The probability function of X, where X is a random
discrete variable representing
trials,

total points

across the four

can be easily obtained by summing the calculated

joint probabilities for each unique value of X.

The resultant

probability and distribution function of X for three values
of £ are shown in Table 3.7 and the family of significance
curves is in Figure 3.5.
The fortuitous models
viduals or groups as pass,

can be used to classify i n d i 

fail or fortuitous

The pass categorization is determined

(transitional?).

by selecting a s i g n i f i 

cance level and comparing the individual's score with
appropriate curve of Figure 3.3 or 3.5.

the

Groups can be an a 

lyzed for fortuitous behavior be doing a goodness of fit test
for observed vs.

theoretical probabilities or a test of s i g 

nificance on the sample mean vs.

the expected mean.
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TABLE 3.7

PROBABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS OF FORTUITOUS
PERFORMANCE

FDR A FOUR TRIAL SET UNDER

THE ELKIND CRITERION

£ = 1/3, a = 2/3

a = 2/ 5 * 5L = 3/ 5

£ = 1/ 2 , £

= 1/2

X

R(X)

I

r (x

)

2

.0878

1 .000

.0324

1 .000

.01 56

1 .000

3

.0878

.9121

.0648

.9676

.0320

.9843

4

.1 536

.8243

.118

.9028

.0780

.9523

5

.1 536

.6707

.1 296

.7840

.0936

.8743

6

.1 372

.51 71

.1 440

.6544

.1 248

.7807

7

.1 536

.3799

.1 584

.51 04

.1 563

.6559

8

.0879

.2263

.1296

.3520

.1 406

.4996

9

.071 3

.1 385

.1056

.2224

.1 560

.3590

1□

.0384

.0672

.0528

.1 1 68

.0780

.2030

11

.01 65

.0287

.0384

.0640

.0625

.1 250

12

.01 23

.01 23

.0256

.0256

.0625

.0625

^ = 5 . 7 7 7 , < t 2= 5.545

a(x)

X

r (x

)

/U=6.485 , c?=5 .71 3

a(x)

rn(x)

/V = 7 .365 , <j2= 5 .902

1 .00

£ e (x )

1/2

2/5
1/3

1D

12

X

Fig. 3.5.
Significance curves of fortuitous performance
under the Elkind criterion.
CD
(_*J
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Levels of Measurement
Nominal Level
Under the assumption of a nominal level of m e a s u r e 
ment subjects are simply categorized
failed on the set of problems.

as having passed or

A quote from Torgerson

(1967)

is appropriate:
In measurement as we use the term, the number assigned
refers to the relative amount or degree of a property
possessed by the object itself, whereas, in the different
nominal scales, the numbers refer to the objects or
classes of objects.
It is the object that is named or
classified [p. 17].
Torgerson also observes that in nominal measurement
the notion of property is not moot and that the objects
categorized with regard

are

to the presence o r absence of one,

a compound of properties.

The property observed

or

in the d i s 

sertation studywas a r e s p o n s e — constrained by the procedures
of the designated c r i t e r i a — and the property inferred was the
presence or absence of certain cognitive structuresin the sub
ject.

With identification of only the pass-fail categories

the relative degrees of the property are simply,
there" or "likely not at all there."

"likely all

A consequence of n o m i 

nal measurement is that non-parametric statistical methods
should be applied to the data.
A subject merits a given classification by virtue of
his performance meeting or not meeting the specified r e q u i r e 
ments.

In the study the three

1)judgment,

scoring criteria employed were

2) judgment/explanation

and 3) Elkind.

Within

each of these domains there are still criteria to be decided
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upon.

For example,

what is:

minimum correct judgments,
judgment/explanation
fied Elkind,

an acceptable explanation,

the

the minimum number of correct

compounds,

and so forth.

the minimum score for m o d i 

It is desirable to be objective

and consistent from method to method in making these latter
decisions

upon criteria,

and the significance

from the fortuitous models

levels

derived

afford precisely this sense of

closure.
Fortuitous models were prepared for both the judgment
and Elkind criteria but not for the
criterion.

judgment/explanation

This exclusion was based on the assumption that

in support of a correct judgment the

likelihood of an acc e p t 

able explanation being generated fortuitously is sufficiently
remote to justify setting its probability close to zero.
Indeed this is utlimately an empirical question but co n 
temporary notions in psycholinguistics
possibilities

for grammatical

regarding the myriad

utterances gives the zero p r o b a 

bility high axiomatic credence and is so invoked.

As the

probability of 4 out of 4 correct judgments was determined to
be

.0625

(see Table 3.6)

it follows that the probability of

4 of 4 acceptable judgment/explanations is less than
Thus,

.0625.

the latter criterion runs less risk of false positive

diagnostics than the former.

Interval Level Measures
An interval level measure implies that the attribute
of interest can be meaningfully described as a continuum.
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The particular properties of the number system that are
retained at this level are order and distance.
property assures that a set of measured

The former

values can be uniquely

ordered while the latter holds that the differences between
pairs of values are uniquely ordered.

Transitivity holds for

both properties and the series of measurements does not have
a unique origin,

i.e.,

one object cannot meaningfully be said

to possess a multiple more
another object.

(or less)

of the attribute than

The reader desiring more depth on t h e o r e t i 

cal implications is referred to Torgerson
and generally advantageous

(1958).

consequence of interval level data

is the propriety of using parametric statistical
which

A practical

techniques

require the order and distance property of numbers.
In

c o n s e r v a t i o n research,

interval level measures

are not used as frequently as the nominal

level and there has

been very little formal discussion on this matter.

Part of

the definition of interval level measurement is that the
numbers must be determined

to within

y = ax + b, where a is any positive
number.

a linear transformation
number and b

A consequence of this requirement

ferences between pairs of measurements

any real

is that the d i f 

can be meaningfully

ratioed and these ratios remain invariant regardless of the
measurement
If,

units.
at the interval level,

conservation is assessed

by x and is also measured with another method,
x should be perfectly correlated

y, then y and

if the measures are to be

subject to the prescribed linear transformation.

Three

07

scoring

techniques--albeit

not procedurally or statistically

independent of each o t h e r — were employed in the study and if
the assumption of interval level data is reasonable,
vidual scares should be highly correlated.
is part of all three scoring methods,
dependence,

the ind i 

Since a judgment

there is a built-in

thus any resultant linear correspondence

is far

from c o n c l u s i v e — but at least s u g g e s t i v e — evidence for the
viability of an interval measure of continuum of conservation.
The three scoring criteria and different levels of
measurement/analyses were adopted primarily to facilitate c o m 
parison of this study's results with those of other i n v e s t i 
gators,

all of whom have used one or another of the scoring

procedures and analyses.

It is also of general interest to

determine the correspondences
to thus draw inferences

among the criteria/analyses and

regarding the extent to which a c o n 

flict of results from very similar studies can be attributed
to differences in the scoring and data analyses procedures
respectively employed.
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SECTION

IV

RESULTS OF THE STUDY

Introduction
As described in the previous

chapter,

the basic design

of the study was to examine the effects of four factors:
Object,

Conflict,

Memory and Sequence.

The subjects were

selected on the basis of their age such that

they were not yet

likely to be concrete operational but old enough to u nder
stand what was asked of them in the problems;

i.e.,

late preoperational to early concrete operational.
jects'

ages and pretest scores were

interval level data,

roughly
The s u b 

used as covariates for

but the analyses of covariance

indicated

that these variables did not markedly effect the error varia
tion or differences

between groups— the latter obtained p r i 

marily because the cells were balanced

for mean age and p r e 

test

However,

scores were correlated with age.

of the subjects who

"passed"

the mean

their set of four problems was

somewhat higher than the mean age for all the subjects
vs 65.18).

The standard

age

(67.47

normal deviate of 1.60,calculated on

the sample of 17 who passed the judgment criterion,indicated
that the probability that this sample came from the
tion'

of total subjects was about

.06.

In the original design

the age range was intended to be 5-6 years,
made it infeasible to get a large enough

'popula

but circumstances

sample in this range.

89

The more homogeneous

sample would have been contributory to

less error variation,

especially of an interactive nature in

that this source of error cannot be compensated for by the
analysis of covariance.
Consequently the data was also analyzed with age as
a factor.
analyzed

It was decided that the variance should not be
as a five factor

( 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 )

this would have necessitated as few as two

design since

observations in

one cell and only three observations in four other cells.

An

analysis of the nominal level data did indicate that the pr o 
files across age were

comparable

at the two Sequence levels.

As the analyses of the original basic design
there were no effects

showed that

for the Sequence f a c t o r — nor was it of

any particular theoretical interest— it was eliminated for
the age analyses.

The resultant design incorporating

a factor was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3

where the first three factors

were the same as in the basic design
Sequence)
Age:
that

(Object,

Conflict,

and the fourth factor comprised of three levels of

(1) Young,

(2) Middle,

and

(3) Old.

a first age analysis used a median

levels of age,

It should be noted

split to describe two

but this yielded no effects so a tri-partition

Age factor was instituted.
Age factor

age as

(in months)

The basis for the level.s of the

are shown in Table 4.1.

With the introduction of age as a factor the organiza
tion of the presentation of the results

is itself reminiscent

of a balanced factorial design and is outlined in Figure 4.1
The sequence of presentation will be:
(2) Nominal level data and

(3)

(1) General findings,

Interval level data.
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TABLE 4.1

AGE DATA FOR THE 3-LEVEL AGE FACTOR
AND THE MEDIAN SPLIT

3
Levels

Median
Split
^

Level

Range

Mean

Young

-61

58.3

Std.

Dev.

2.94

Number

29

Middle

62-68

64.9

1.94

37

Old

69+

72.1

2.29

30

High

65+

70.0

3.31

48

,
Low

-64

60.3

3.40

48
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GENERAL

NOMINAL LEVEL

SEQUENCE

3 CRITERIA

INTERVAL LEVEL

AGE

3 CRITERIA

Fig. 4.1.
results.

SEQUENCE

3 CRITERIA

Organization of presentation of

AGE

3 CRITERIA
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General Findings
The

overall means,

standard deviations and d e s c r i p 

tions of the study variables are given

in Table 4.2.

first step in the organization of the data,
the linear relationships
executed.

As a

an analysis of

among all the study variables was

The factor matrix from a principal components

solution with varimax rotation performed on the fifteen
variable set is shown in Table 4.3.
for characteristic root values of

Factors were extracted

.7 or greater, which yielded

87 percent of the total variance for the five factors.

The

first component is easily identified as the "conservation
score factor" where the scores across
within each Memory condition
higher.

the four problems and

(2 problems)

all load at

.90 or

The only other variable that correlates appreciably

with the first component is the Conflict and its positive
loading implies that

scores tend to be higher for the

Imagery

level.
The second

component

is made up of the Age and P r e 

test variables which are correlated only moderately

(.30)

with each other but sufficiently interrelated to emerge as
effectively the sole variables on this component.
fourth and fifth components,
Sex,

comprised respectively of the

Sequence and Object variables,

involves only a single variable.

are unique as each

It is noteworthy that these

three variables are not implicated with
variables.

The third,

any of the dependent

The rotated factor matrix shows the data to be

reasonable and that within the linear system there are no
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TABLE 4.2

STUDY VARIABLES:

DESCRIPTION MEAN

AND STANDARD DEVIATION

Variable
No .

Description

Mean

1

judgment criterion:

recall cue

2

judgment criterion:
cue

no recall

3

judgment criterion:
total

4 took

4

Std.

Dev.

.521

0.821

.573

0.867

1 .094

1 .596

judge/explain criterion:
cue

recall 1 .833

3.093

5

judge/explain criterion:
recall cue

no

6

judge/explain criterion:
took total

4

7

Elkind criterion:

recall cue

a

Elkind criterion:
cue

no recall

9

Elkind criterion:

4 took total

10

pretest score

11

age,

12

sex:

13

object factor:
between = 2

14

conflict factor:
image = 2

15

sequence factor:
recall first
= 1 , recall second = 2

in months
female = 1 , male = 2
within = 1 ,

concrete = 1 ,

1 .958

3.1 91

3.791

6.1 45

2.81 2

1 .882

2.91 7

1 .895

5.729

3.555

5.677

0.788

65.187

5.913

1 .542

0.501

1 .500

0.502

1 .500

0.502

1 .500

0.502

TABLE 4.3
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF STUDY VARIABLES PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS
SOLUTION VARIMAX WITH ROTATION

Variable No.

1

2

Components
3

4

5

Final
Communality

1

.936

.115

-.072

-.01 5

.079

.902

2

.941

-.026

.002

.029

-.116

.900

3

.882

.045

-.035

.008

-.022

.9B9

4

.947

.1 39

-.039

.033

.045

.921

5

.968

.059

.004

.048

-.076

.948

6

.979

.101

-.017

.042

-.01 6

.972

7

.903

.1 66

-.062

.004

.1 89

.883

8

.933

.029

-.01 7

.005

-.053

.874

9

.975

.1 04

-.042

.005

.072

.969

10

.082

.792

-.065

-.129

.21 5

.700

11

.1 29

.792

.039

.1 59

-.1 92

.708

12

.003

-.049

.948

-.045

-.064

.907

13

.01 4

.01 6

-.037

.01 5

.957

.91 8

14

.589

-.099

-.444

-.076

-.096

.569

15

.037

.01 9

-.027

.983

.01 4

.969

Variance proportion

.5786

.0876

.0768

.0689

.0635

Cumulative
Variance proportion

.5786

.662

.7430

.8119

.8754
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surprising or uninterpretable

allocations of variation.

The high c o r r e lations between the three criterion
m e a s u r e s — variables

6 and 9 in Table 4.4, lend credence

3,

to employment of a continuous measure
lems.

in conservation p r o b 

Of course judgment was parcel to all three of the

criterion measures and there were various procedural d e p e n 
dencies that would also contribute to strong i n t e r - c o r r e l a 
tions.

In the judge/ explain criterion

there could be no c o r 

rect explanation with a correct judgment and for the m o d i 
fied Elkind criterion,

the second question was not asked

unless the initial conservation judgment was incorrect.

TABLE 4.4

INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE THREE CRITERION
AT THE

1

INTERVAL LEVEL:

2

3

4

VARIABLES

5

1 - 9

6

7

2

.79

3

.94

.95

4

.97

.81

.94

5

.86

.96

.96

91

6

.94

.91

.97

98

.98

7

,96

.75

.90

93

.82

•
CD
VO

1

CO

•79

.96

.92

82

.94

.90

.77

9

.93

.91

.97

93

.93

.95

.94

8

96

Within each criterion the correlation between the
score in the Recall and No Recall condition--variables
4 vs 5,

and 7 vs 8— are quite high,

indicating that the two

levels of the Memory factor were somewhat
each other.

1 vs 2,

commensurate with

In general both the non-parametric and p a r a 

metric analyses of the data confirmed the impotence of the
Memory factor,

thus the emphasis

in reporting the results and

drawing conclusions will be upon the subjects'
over the four trials.
trary is made,
ables 3,

Unless a specific statement to the c o n 

the referenced criterion scores will be v a r i 

6 and 9 which are respectively,

Judge/Explain

(JETOT)

In all,

and Elkind

Judgment

(JTOT),

(ETOT).

there were 26 subjects who made at least 2

correct judgments.
judgments,

total score

The data indicating the number of correct

attendant verbal rationale,

and acceptable/unaccept

able status is shown in the Appendix in Table A . 8 .

Two judges

independently rated the verbal explanations according
guidelines discussed

in Section

ratings was achieved

in 96 percent of the cases and a test of

independence
correlated

(X

III.2.

to the

Concurrence between

showed the judges'decisions to be significantly
= 34.58, £ < .001,

Yates correction).

It is

interesting to note that in the 17 cases where the subject
made the requisite 4 of 4 correct judgments,
curred 100 percent,

the judges c o n 

and that only one of the 26 instances of

2 or more correct judgments was in a Concrete Conflict p a r a 
digm .
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Nominal Level Measures

Sequence as a Factor
Each subject was categorized as pass or fail in
accord with the appropriate Fortuitous model and s i g n i f i 
cance level specifications

(Table 3.3).

For the purposes of

investigating the role of the recall cue,

a subject received

one pass mark if he performed correctly on the two trials
within a respective Memory level.

It should be noted that

for the resultant data shown in Table 4.5,
entries per subject,

there are two

or 2 x 96 in a l l .

5ince the frequencies in Table 4.5 are not i n d e p e n 
dent of each other,
ate

(McNemar,

1969).

a Chi-Square test is not quite a p p r o p r i 
Due to the inflated sample size the

calculated values of Chi Square are exaggerated,

and as even

these overestimates

the i n d e 

are clearly not significant,

pendence of the Memory factor

and performance is not rejected.

The Chi Square values, calculated on the data of Table 4 . 6 , show
that a subject's performances in the Recall and No Recall
trials are not independent of each other.
preted as sound evidence

The above is i n t e r 

for the negligible effect of the

Memory factor.
The results

for JTOT,

respectively in Tables 4.7,
explanatory.

Under the

JETOT and ETOT,

4.8 and 4.9,

presented

are in large self-

JTOT criterion there were seventeen

pass classifications but only one of these was in a Concrete
Conflict paradigm

(Table 4.7a).

The distribution of pass and

fail for the four paradigms is shown in Table 4.7b and the
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TABLE 4.5

DISTRIBUTION OF PA5S AND FAIL ON MEMORY

FACTOR:

TWO ENTRIES PER SUBJECT

Criteria
Judg e/Explain

Judgm ent
Cue

No Cue

Cue

No Cue

21

25

17

19

75

71

79

77

TABLE 4.6

CORRESPONDENCE

OF PERFORMANCE WITHIN SUBJECT ACROSS
THE MEMORY FACTOR

Criterion
Judgment

Judgment/Explain

Recall Cue

Recall Cue

Pass

Fail

Pass

Fail

Pass

17

8

16

8

Fail

4

67

4

68

No Cue

X 2 = 4.1 6 , £

<.001
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chi square indicates a dependency between success and p ara
digm.

Table 4.7c shows that the relationship between Con

flict and success is crucial,
factors are of no consequence.
archy of difficulty to be:

while the Object and Sequence
Table 4.7d shows the h i e r 

CE = CIC >

CEN = Cl.

The JETOT criterion yielded 16 passes
ETOT gave 20 passes

(Table 4.9b).

(Table 4.8b)

The findings

and

for the three

criterion are markedly similar except for the total number of
passes.

This discrepancy is,

however,

just

as would be

expected from the respective tolerance levels of fortuitous
performance.

ETOT was most lenient in this

JETOT was the most stringent,
performances

(i.e.,

pass)

regard while

and the number of non-fortuitous

within each criterion appropriately

reflects these specifications.

The tolerance

of fortuity also

contributed to an apparent difference in discriminability
along the paradigm and levels of Conflict dimensions,
the probability of type
for JETOT.

As the

in that

II error was least for ETOT and highest

"actual"

differences among the paradigms

and between the Conflict levels are the same regardless of
criterion,

and thetotal sample size was a constant,

said that ETOT had the most power,

or was the criterion most

likely to yield statistically-significant results
1969).

it can be

(Cohen,

1 □□

TABLE 4.7

RE5ULT5 OF JUDGMENT CRITERION,
SEQUENCE

4 of 4 CORRECT = PASS:

AS A FACTOR

Table 4.7a
Frequency of Pass in Each Experimental Condition

Between Obj ect

Within Obj ect

CE

CEN

CIC

Cl

Sequence 1

0

3

1

3

Sequence 2

0

5

0

5

Table 4.7b
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Four Conservation Paradigms

CE
Pass

0

Fail

24

X 2 = 12.92, £ <.01

CIC

CEN
1

23

Cl

8

8

16

16

1 01

Table 4.7c
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Experiment Factors

Conflict

Concrete

Sequence

Object

Image

Within

Between

1

2

Pass

1

16

9

8

7

10

Fail

47

32

39

40

41

38

X 2 = 16.1, £ < .001

Table 4.7d
Chi 5quare Values and Siqnificance

Levels

for Paired Comparisons of the Four
Conservation Paradiqms

X2
£

CE-CIC

CE-CEN

.021

7.72

7.72

5.26

5.26

.01

.01

.05

.05

CE-CI

CIC-CEIM

CIC-CI

CEN-■Cl

0

1 02

TABLE 4.8

RESULTS

FOR JUDGMENT PLUS EXPLANATION CRITERION,
4 CORRECT = PASS:

4 of

SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR

Table 4.Ba
Number of Passes in Each Experimental

Condition

With in Object

Between Obj ect
CE

CEN

CIC

Cl

1

0

3

1

3

Sequence 2

0

4

0

5

Sequence

Table 4.8b
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Four Conservation

CE

CIC

Pass

0

1

Fail

24

X 2 = 11.7, £ <.01

23

Paradigms

CEN

Cl

7

8

17

16

1 03

Table 4.Be
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Experimental

Factors

Conflict

Concrete

Sequence

Object

Image

Within

Between

1

2

Pass

1

25

9

7

7

9

F ail

47

33

39

41

41

30

n

CM
X

14.50, £ < .001

Table 4.8d
Chi Square Values

and Siqnificance

Levels

for Paired Comparisons of the Four
Conservation Paradiqms

X2

2.

CE-CIC

CE-CEN

CE-CI

.0«J

6.33

7.72

.02

.01

CIC-CEN

CIC-CI

CEN-CI

4.03

5.26

.096

.05

.05

1 04

TABLE 4.9

RE5ULT5 FOR ELKIND CRITERION,
POINTS:

11 OR 12

SUCCESS SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR

Table

4.9a

Number of Passes in Each Experimental Condition

Between 0bj ect

Within Obj ect

CE

CEN

CIC

Cl

Sequence 1

0

4

1

4

Sequence 2

0

6

0

5

Table 4.9b
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Four Conservation

CE

Pass

0

Fail

24

X 2 = 20.72, £ 4.001

CIC

1
23

Paradigms

CEN

Cl

10

9

14

15

1 05

Table 4.9c
Distribution of Pass and Fail for the
Experimental Factors

Conflict

Concrete

Sequence

Object

Image

Within

Between

1

2

Pass

1

19

10

10

9

11

Fail

47

29

38

38

39

38

X 2 = 20.5,

p

4..001

Table 4.9d
Chi Square Values and 5iqnificance Levels
for Paired Comparisons
Conservation

CE-CIC

X2

£

.021

of the Four

Paradiqms

CE-CEN

CE-CI

CIC-CEN

CIC-CI

CEN-CI

10.74

9.16

9.54

6.58

.086

.01

.01

.01

.02

1 06

Age

as a Factor

The salient data for the JTOT,

JETOT and ETOT c r i 

teria are respectively presented in Tables 4.10,
4.12.

4.11

and

The allocation of pass and fail across the three

ages for JTOT is in Table 4.10a.

The Middle and Old s u b 

jects performed equally well and significantly better than
the Young children,

as only one of the latter earned a pass.

The more interesting finding is presented

in Table

4.10b

where it is seen that only in Imagery paradigms was there any
differential performance between the Age groups.

The i n t r a 

paradigm performance data is presented in Table 4.10b and
none of the chi square values reach the
5.99,

although Cl is very near.

probabilities

.05 critical value of

The chi square values and

for Within vs Between and Concrete vs

are shown in Table 4.10c.

Imagery

The Object comparisons are all

negligible whereas differences on the Conflict factor are
observed

at the Mid and Old Age l e v e l s .

as shown in Table 4.11,

The

results for JETOT,

are very much like those for JTOT.

The results for ETOT deviate a bit from the other
criteria.

From Table 4.12a it can be seen that,

with JTOT,

one more Young subject and two more Mid subjects

passed in ETOT,

and the proportional increase was such that

the chi square only reached the
Mid and Old data are combined,
tant 2 x 2
4.'i8,

.10 level.

However,

(p<.05,

For the intra-paradigm comparisons

shows a significant,

p < .05,

if the

the chi square for the resul-

contingency table is significant

df = 1).

as compared

X

=

only Cl

relationship between Age and

success

(see Table 4.12b).
The comparisons on the Object

factor

and Conflict

factor of Table 4.12c shows ETOT to be similar to the other
criteria except that the

Imagery level is significantly

easier for the Mid as well as the Old subjects.
previously that regards the paradigms

It was noted

and the Conflict factor,

ETOT had greater statistical power than either JTOT or JETOT,
and it seems likely that this sensitivity is effectively m a n i 
fest at Mid and Young,

but not at the Old,

age levels.
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TABLE 4.10

RE5ULT5 FOR JUDGMENT CRITERION 4 of 4 CORRECT =
5UCCE55:

AGE AS A FACTOR

Table 4.10a
Distribution of Pass and Fail Across Age

Young

Mid

Old

8

Pass

1

8

Fail

28

29

n

(M
X

6.07,

p

22

< . 05

Table 4.10b
Dis tribution of Pass and Fail Across Aqe within
the Conservation Paradiqms

CEN

Cl

CE

CIC

Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old

Pass

1

3

4

0

4

4

0

0

0

0

1

0

Fail

5

7

4

7

6

3

9

8

7

7

8

8
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Table 4.10c
Chi 5quare Values and Significance Levels for
Within vs Between
Image

(C-I)

(W-B)

Factors at Each

Young

X2
£

and Concrete vs
Age Level

Mid

W-B

C-I

W-B

1

1

1

Old

C-I

W-B

3.37

0

.10

C-I

9.02
.005
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TABLE 4.11

RESULTS FDR JUDGMENT PLUS

EXPLANATION CRITERION,

4 CORRECT = SUCCESS:

4 of

AGE AS A FACTOR

Table 4.11a
Distribution of Pass and Fail Across Aqe

Young

Mid

Old

7

8

Fail

28

30

22

X

II

1

INJ

Pass

5.95, £_ < .05

Table 4.11b
Distribution of Pass and Fail Across Aq e within
the Conservation Paradiqms

CEN

Cl

CIC

CE

Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old

Pass

1

2

4

0

4

4

0

0

0

0

1

0

Fail

5

8

4

7

6

3

9

8

7

7

8

8
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Table 4.11c
Chi Square Values and Significance Levels for
Within vs Between
Image

(C-I)

(W-B)

Factors at Each Age Level

Young

X2
p

and Concrete vs

Mid

W-B

C-I

W-B

1

1

1

Old

C-I

2.30
.15

W-B

0

C-I

9.020
.005
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TABLE 4.12

RESULTS FOR ELKIND CRITERION,

11 OR 12 POINTS = SUCCESS:

AGE A5 A FACTOR

Table 4.12a
Distribution of Pass

and Fail Across Age

Young

Mid

Old

Pass

2

10

8

Fail

27

27

22

II

CM
X

4.78, £ < . 1 0

Table 4.12b
Distribution of Pass and Fail Across Aqe within
the Conservation Paradigms

CEN

Cl

CE

CIC

Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old Young Mid Old

Pass

2

4

4

0

5

4

0

0

0

0

1

0

Fail

4

6

4

7

5

3

9

8

7

7

8

8

1 13

Table 4.12c
Chi Square Values and Significance Levels for
Within vs Between
Image

(C-I)

(W-B)

Factors at Each Age Level

Young

X2
p

and Concrete vs

Mid

W-B

C-I

W-B

1

1

1

Old

C-I

W-B

C-I

6.01

0

9.020

.02

.005
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Interval Level Measures

Sequence

as a Factor

The cell means for the basic design are shown in
Table 4.13.
(Manova),

The variance was analyzed by multivariate

univariate

techniques.

(Anova)

and repeated measures

(RM)

In the Manova a subject's score in the Recall

and the No Recall conditions were the two dependent variables,
while in the Anova the total score for the two Memory levels
was the dependent variable.

The RM analysis treated the

Recall and No Recall scores as the two repeated measures.
order to contrast the three scoring

techniques,

each criterion

was analyzed with the above statistical procedures,

thus nine

separate result summaries are reported in Table 4.14
Anova)

and Table 4.15

(Manova,

(RM).

Due to the multiplicity of statistical procedures
criteria,

and

it was desirable to have an objective--distribution

free if p o s sible— measure
results.

In

to compare the various analyses

It was also necessary to have this general measure

of the disparity among group means
multifactor and multivariate

uniformly applicable to

(dependent)

analyses.

priate measure is the Wilks lambda criterion,

-A_ ,

An appro
which is

derived from the mathematical theory of likelihood-ratio
criteria
parity,

(Anderson,

1958). _/\- is inversely related to the d i s 

that is, the larger the d i s p a r i t y — relative to within

group variability— the smaller is

A-

.

In the Manova case

the larger the disparity among group centroids--relative to

TABLE 4.13

CELL MEANS FDR THE EIGHT GROUP,
DESIGN:

2 X 2 X 2 X 2 FACTORIAL

SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR

Group Means
Covariates
Paradigm

CIC

Cl

CE

CEN

PreTest

Judgment

Judge/Explain

Elkind

0

C

5

1

1

1 12

5.67 64.1

0.1 67 0.1 67 0.333 0.667 0.667 1 .333 1 .917 2.000 3.91 7

1

1

2 12

5.58 67.1

0.000 0.1 67 0.1 67 0.000 0.333 0.333 1 .500 1 o833 3.333

1

2

1 12

5.33

64.5

0.833 1 .1 67 2.000 2.833 3.667 6 .500 3.333 4.1 67 7.500

1

2

2 12

5.75 65.8

0.91 7 1 .000 1 .91 7 3.500 3.667 7.167 3.41 7 3.667 7.083

2

1

1 12

6.00 64.5

0.083 0.000 0.083 0.333 0.000 0.333 2.1 67 1 .833 4.000

2

1

2 12

5.33 64.0

0.083 0.000 0.083 0.1 67 0.000 0.1 67 2.1 67 1.917 4.083

2

2

1 12

5. 75 65.8

0.917 0.750 1 .667 2.667 2.500 5.1 67 3.500 3.41 7 6.91 7

2

2

2 12

6.00 66.1

1 .1 67 1 .333 2.500 4.500 4.833 9 .333 4.500 4.500 9.000

n

Age

R

NR

Total

R

NR

Key of Symbols:
0 = object:
1 = Within, 2 = Between
C = Conflict:
1 = Concrete, 2 = Image
5 = Sequence:
1 = Recall cue first, 2 = Cue second
n = number of subjects in the group
R = Recall cue (2 tasks)
NR = No Recall cue (2 tasks)
Total = R + NR scores (4 tasks)

Total

R

NR

Total

TABLE 4.14
INTERVAL LEVEL DATA RESULT SUMMARY FDR 3 FACTOR MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE:

SEQUENCE AS A FACTOR

Judgment

Judge/Explain

2 Dependent 1 Dependent
variables
variable

Elkind

2 Dependent 1 Dependent
variables
variable

2 Dependent 1 Dependent
variables
variable

F

1- A .

F

1 -JS-

F

1— A.

F

1- W

F

1 -j\_

F

1- W

Obj ect

1 .39b

.031

.01

.000

1.17b

.026

.00

.000

2.43b

.053

.76

.008

Conflict

23.51a

.351

.347

18.74a

46 .92a

.300 3 6.35a

.292

19.3a

.307 37.06a

.296

Sequence

.29

.007

.29

.003

.40

.009

.72

.008

.12

.003

.22

.002

0 x C

.16

.003

.29

.000

.11

.002

.21

.002

.03

.001

.40

.000

0 x S

.91

.020

1 .00

.01 1

.92

.021

1 .01

.01 1

.94

.021

1 .62

.01 8

C x 5

.37

.008

.72

.008

1..14

.025

1 .94

.021

.66

.015

.76

.008

1 .60

.035

.48

.005

.94

.021

.38

.004

.613

.014

.54

.006

0 x C x S
Error 0""^

1 .76

.1 32

00

£ < .001

h-

b : £ < .25

a:

II

c.001

CM

a: £

df = 1 ,88

a

df = 2 ,87

12.27

a : ,£ < .001
b : .£ < .50

3.78

27. 89
df = 1 ,88
a : •:. £

.001

df = 2,87
a:

£ <;. 001

b:

£<.10

9. 31
df = 1 ,88
a:

£ < . 001

116
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TABLE 4.15

INTERVAL LEVEL DATA RESULT SUMMARY FOR 4 FACTOR
REPEATED MEASURE ANALYSIS:

SEQUENCE

AS A FACTOR

Judgment

Conflict

.00
46.90a

i

Li_

Ob j e c t

.000
.347

Elkind

Judge/Explain

-JL

F

1

.00

.000

36.35a

.292

F

1
.76

37.06a

-Jl

.008
.296

Sequence

.29

.003

.72

.008

.22

.002

Memory Cue

.07

.01 0

.85

.01 0

.64

.007

OxC

.29

.003

.21

.002

.04

.000

0x5

1 .00

.01 1

1 .01

.01 1

1 .62

.01 8

OxM

2.81 b

.003

2.37b

.002

4.32b

.046

Cx5

.72

.008

1 .94

.021

.76

.008

CxM

.07

1 .52

.001

1 .25

.01 4

5xM

.31

.09

.000

.03

.003

OxCxS

.48

.38

.004

.54

.006

OxSxM

.87

.85

.000

.23

OxCxM

.03

.00

.000

.03

CxSxM

.03

.38

.000

.04

2.81 c

1 .52c

.001

•63c

OxCxSxM
Error

^

MxSubj ect
Within
df
a: £ ^
b: £ <
c: £ ^

.005

.15

.88
1 ,88
.001
.10
.10

.879
13.95

.81
4.66

1 ,88
.001
.10

1 ,88
.001
.10

.25

.50
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the within groups generalized variance--the smaller is _A* .
The reader is directed to Tatsouka

(1971)

for a co m p r e 

hensive and comprehensible treatment of the Wilks likeli
hood ratio.
The Wilks ratio is most generally defined as

TV = Ise j/15 h

+ Sej.

products matrix,

5e is the sums of squares and cross

SSCP,

and

j

Se | is its determinant.

Sh is

the SSCP matrix for the effect being tested by a given
hypothesis

and

j Sh|

is its determinant.

|sh + 5e|

determinant of the sum of the 5h and Se matrices.
minants are employed

null

is the
The d eter

in the Manova case whereas in the Anova,

Se is simply the proper error variation

and Sh is the vari

ation between the groups for the null hypothesis of interest.
For example,
SSb),

where:

in a 1-way Anova we would have

TV =

55w is the within groups variation,

between groups variation

5 5 w / (SSw +
SSb is the

and SSw + SSb is the total variation

about the grand mean.
As

1 -TV

TV is

inversely related

is directly proportional to the disparity and in d i c a 

tive of proportion variance

TV,

to the d i s c r i m i n a b i l i t y ,

where appreciable,

accountable.

The values of 1 -

for the null hypotheses in the var i 

ance analyses are also reported in Table 4.14 and Table 4.15.
The only significant effect in the Anova is on the
Conflict factor,

as the

Imagery level yielded much higher

scores than the Concrete level.
other important effect

There was not a hint of any

and the results were consistent for

all three criterion measures,

but as indicated by 1 -

1 19

JTOT'was in absolute terms slightly the better d i s c r i m i 
nator.
The results for the Manova were very similar to those
in Anova except that there was a near significant
Object

(jd < .10)

effect for the Elkind criterion in the Manova.

This

effect washes out when the scores for the two Memory levels
are combined

(i.e.,

in the Anova)

and is thus indicative of

a possible Object x Memory interaction.
The RM analyses show:

a marked effect for Conflict,

no differences for Object and,
a significant

(£ < .05)

for the Elkind criterion only,

Object x Memory interaction.

The

interaction prompted a test for simple main effects and a
significant difference

( £ < . 05) was found for Recall vs No

Recall in the Within Object condition.

This simple effect

is summarized for each of the criteria in Table 4.16 and is
diagrammed for the Elkind

criterion in Figure 4.2.

As can

be seen from the diagram,

the Recall tended to diminish p e r 

formance in the Within Object paradigms and was inco n s e 
quential in Between Object cases.
The hierarchy of difficulty among the paradigms was
determined by ordered comparisons of the respective mean per
formances.

The Newman-Keuls

(Winer,

1972)

and the results are presented in Table
the criterion,
CEN.

procedure was used

4.17.

Regardless of

the hierarchy of difficulty is CE = CIO ?

The Concrete paradigms are each significantly

more difficult than the
each other,

Imagery cases,

and the Imagery paradigms

Cl =

(£<..01)

but not different from
are of equal difficulty.

TABLE 4.16

SIMPLE EFFECTS OF RECALL CUE V 5 NO RECALL CUE
FOR THE WITHIN OBJECT CONDITION

Judgment

Judge/Explain

Elkind

F

3.39

3.029

4.14

E

.10

.1 00

.05

df

CD
CD
*

1 ,88

1 ,88

3.2

3.0

Elkind
Score

2.8

2.6

2.4
Within
Obj ect

Fig. 4.2
Object x Memory cue
Elkind criterion.

Between
Object

Interaction for the
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TABLE 4.17

ORDERED COMPARISONS OF THE CONSERVATION PARADIGM
MEANS:

NEWMAN-KEULS

PROCEDURE

Judgment Criterion
CE

CE

CIC

.083

CIC

Cl

CEN

.937*

1 .000 *

.854*

.91 7*
.063

Cl
S • cl( -01 )*

.382
Judge/Explain

CE

.292

CIC

.579

.623

Criterion
3.29*

3.500*

3 .00*

3.210*
.208

Cl
S • ol( .01 )*

2.02

2.32

2.470

Elkind Criterion
CIC

.208

CE

1.83*

2.17*

1 .63*

1 .96*

Cl
S

.333
•

a.(.01 )*

1.170

1.33

1 .43

1 22

Perhaps the most notable
with

fact is that for all the analyses

Sequence as a factor,

the proportion of the effect plus

error variation attributable
upwards

of

to the

Conflict hypothesis was

.29.

Age as a Factor
The cells means for the twelve group

design are p r e 

sented in Table 4.18.

The variance was analyzed by Manova

and Anova techniques.

An analysis of covariance via Anova

was also performed using the pretest score as the covariate.
The pretest was a check on the subjects'

comprehensions of

the verbal quantitative relations and was moderately c o r r e 
lated

(.291)

with

each criterion,

age.

The above analyses were executed

thus there are nine s u m m a r i e s — three

c riterion--reported

for

for each

in Table 4.19.

The Conflict again emerged as a strong main effect
while Age was significant
m a rginally so (£ <.10)
gram

(OSIRIS)

in Manova.

also performs

dependent variables.
ses,

(£<.025)

in Anova but only
The Manova computer p r o 

univariate tests for each of the

As was the case for

the Sequence

analy

the univariate tests of significance were highly co n 

sistent with the results of the multivariate
for the Elkind criterion Object effect.
twelve groups,

tests,

except

Also for each

t_ tests — using the error term calculated

correlated samples— between the cell means showed

of the
for

not one

significant difference between the Recall and No Recall co n 
ditions.

As such

_t tests are the least conservative,

it was

TABLE 4.18

CELL MEANS FOR THE TWELVE GROUP 2 X 2 X 2 X 3 FACTORIAL
DESIGN:

AGE AS A FACTOR

Group Means
Covariates
Paradigm

CIC

Cl

CE

CEN

Judgment
R

NR

Judge/Explain
Total

R

NR

Total R

Elkind
NR

Total

0

C

A

n

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
2

7 58.29
9 64.88
8 72.50

5.1 43 0 . 0 0 0 0.1 42 0.1 42 0 . 0 0 0 0.286 0.286 1 .286 1 .71 4 3 .000
5.778 0.222 0.333 0.556 0.889 1.111 2.000 2.111 2.333 4.444
5.876 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 .625 1 .625 3.250

1
1
1

2
2
2

1 7 57.85
2 10 65.70
3

7 71 .85

4.71 4 0.1 43 0.286 0.429 0.286 0.571 0.857 1 .571 2.000 3.571
5.800 0.900 1 .200 2.1 00 3.400 4.000 7.400 3.600 4.200 7.800
6.000 1 .571 1 .714 3.285 5.714 6.286 12.000 4.857 5.429 10.286

2
2
2

1
1
1

1
2

9 58.33
8 64.62
7 71 .71

5.889 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
5.250 0.125 0 . 0 0 0
5.857 0.1 49 0 . 0 0 0

2
2
2

2
2
2

1 6 58.80
2 10 64.40
3
8 72.25

3

3

Age

flit

0.000 0.000 0.000
0.125 0.250 0 . 0 0 0
0.149 0.571 0 . 0 0 0

0 . 0 0 0 1 .889 1 .889 3.778
0.250 2.250 1 .750 4.000
0.571 2.429 2.000 4.429

5 .500 1 .000 1 .1 67 2.1 67 3.000 3.667 6.667 4.000 4.333 8.333
6.000 1 .000 0.900 1 .900 3.600 3 .200 6.800 3.900 3.400 7.300
6.000 1 .125 1 .1 25 2.250 4.000 4.250 8.250 4.1 25 4.375 8.500

Key of 5ymbols:
0 = Object: 1 = Within, 2 = Between
C = Conflict: 1 = Concrete, 2 = Image
A = Age level: 1 = young, 2
= mid, 3 = old
n = number of subjects in the group
R = Recall cue (2 tasks)
NR = No Recall cue (2 tasks)
Total = R + NR scores (4 tasks)
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TABLE 4.79

INTERVAL LEVEL DATA RESULT SUMMARY FDR 3 FACTOR
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
AGE AS A FACTOR

2 Dependent
variables
F

df

£

0

1 .3
2, 83
2,83 .005
25.9
4, 1 66 . 1 0
A
1 .91
OxC
0.15
2, 83
1.14 4, 166
OxA
Cx A
1 .39 4,1 66
OxCxA 1.43 4,1 66

c

1 Dependent
variable
1

-JL

df

F

£

.03
.002 1 ,84
.38 52.04 1 ,84 .00 5
.086 3.64 2, 84 .05
.004
.30 1 .84
.052 1 .92 2. 84 .25
.064 2.87 2, 84 . 1 0
.065 2.79 2, 84 . 1 0

E rror
1 .1 22
<72

1

1 Dependent &.
1 Covariate

-JL

F

df

£

.000 .000 1 ,83
.382
.079
.004
.044
.063
.062

51 .56
3.49
.34
1 .92
2.88
2.77

1

-Jl

.000

1 ,83 .005 .383
2,83 .05 .077
.004
1.,83
2, 83 .25 .004
2,83 . 1 0 .069
2,83 .10 .062

1 .54

1 .525

Judge/Expi;ain Criterion

0

c
A
OxC
OxA
CxA
OxCxA
Error

<r2

1.16 2,83
1 ,84
.000 .00
.027 .00
20 .06 2, 83 .005 .325 38.79 1 ,84 .005 .31 6 32.28
2.03 4,166

. 10

0.11 2,83
1 .05 4,166
1 .67 4,166
1 .1 B 4,166
1 1 .35

.091

3.99
.19
.048 1 .46
.076 3 .01
.054 1 .98

.002

.25

2, 84
1 ,84
2, 84
2,84
2, B4

0

2.48 2,83

c

21 .86 2,83

Error

<f2

2.26
2.26
1 .73
1 .40
1 .46
3.29

4,166
2, B3
4,166
4,166
4,166

. 1 0 . 1 1 0 .97
.005 .345 41.5
. 1 0 .1 00 4.36
.001
.04
.25 .078 2.79
.25 .064 2.39
.25 .067 2 .79
7.94

3.48
.19
1.31
2.90
1.96
25.23

24.93
Elkind

A
OxC
OxA
CxA
OxCx A

.025 .087
.002
.25 .034
. 1 0 .070
.25 .045

1 , 83
.000
1 ,83 .005 .31 5
2,83 .05 .077
1 ,83
.002
2,83
.031
2,83 .10 .065
2,83 .25 .045

Criterion

1 ,84
1 ,84 .005
2, 84 .025
1 ,84
2, 84 . 1 0
2, 84 .10
2, 84 . 1 0

.011 .90
.33140.93
.094 3.73
.000 .03
.062 2.46
.054 2.31
.063 2.76
8.04

1 ,83
1 , 83
2,83
1 ,83
2,83
2,83
2,83

.01 1
.005 .333
.05 .082

.000
.10
. 10

.055
.052
.10 .062
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again evident that the Memory factor had no important role
in the experiment.

Consequently,

results pertain to JTOT,

the remainder of the

JETOT and ETDT

(the scores combined

across the four trials).
Although
the

.10 level,

the Conflict x Age interaction only reached

the simple effects for Age at each level of

Conflict were tested.
cantly

(r * .005)

As anticipated,

higher for Old children in the

dition but there were no differences
(see Table 4.20).

scores were s i g n i f i 
Imagery con

at the Concrete level

This effect was further explored by

ordered comparisons of the performance means

at each Age

level for the Cl and CEN paradigms,

in Tables 4.21

and 4.22,

respectively.

nificantly
were

as shown

In Cl the Young children scored sig

(j d < . 0 1 ) lower than the Mid and Old, and there

no differences between the upper two Age levels.

The

trend for Age in CEIM was not the same as it was in Cl as
none of the differences between the Age levels reached

.05.

The nature of the Conflict x Age effects and the disparate
trends for Cl and CEN in this regard can be observed in
Figure 4.3.
The curious aspects of the disparate trends for Cl
and CEN revolves around the rather high scores
subjects in CEN.

for the Young

A possible rationale for this can be

spawned by noting the relatively small sample size

(n = 6 )

for the CEN-Young group and the rather superior performance
of two of its members.

One of these subjects

performed perfectly and the other

(61

months)

(60 months)
managed three
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TABLE 4.20

SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS FOR AGE AT
THE TWO LEVELS OF THE
CONFLICT FACTOR

Judgment

£
Image
Conflict
Concrete
Conflict

££

5.789 2,84

<1

2,84

Judge/Explain

it

.005

£

££

6.12 2,84

<1

2,84

E

.005

Elkind

£

££

e

6.24 2 , 8 4 . 0 0 5

<1

2,84
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TABLE 4.21

ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES
AT EACH AGE LEVEL FOR THE Cl PARADIGM:
NEWMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE

Ajjje Level

1

3
Judgment Criterion

1

2.857*

1 .671 *

2

1.186

S(cl .01 )*

1 .660

1 .890

S(£ .05)**

1.245

1 .496
Judge/Explain Criterion

1

11 .143*

6.543**

2

4.600

S(£L .01 )*

6.711

7.630

S(JSL .05)**

5.051

6.069
Elkind Criterion

1

4.22B*

2

6.71 5*
2.485

S(a

.01 )*

3.789

4.310

S(s

.05)**

2.852

3.427

1 28

TABLE 4.22

ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES
AT EACH AGE LEVEL FOR THE CEN PARADIGM:
NEWMAN-KEULS

PROCEDURE

Judgment Criterion
Age Level

2
2

1

3
.350

.2667

1

.083
1.2450

S(fl .05)

1 .496
Jud ge/Explain
Criterion
Age Level

1
1

2

3

.1 40

1 .584

2

1 .450

S(£.05)

5.051

6.069
Elkind Criterion
Age Level

2
1

1

3

1 .030

1 .200

2

S(g_ .05)

.1 70
2 .852

3.427

Judgment Criterion
4
Within

Between

3

Image

Score

Cl

CIC

Concrete
2

CE
3

Age Level

Judge/Explain Criterion
14
Within

12

Between

1□

Score

8
6

Image

4

2

Concrete

CIC

CE

0
Age Level

3

1 29

2

Elkind Criterion

Within

Between
CEN

B

Image

Score
CIC
CE
Concrete
1

2

3

Age Level

Fig.
4.3
Age x Conflict interaction:
level of the Object factor.

Overall and at each

1 30

correct responses.

Given that the age ceiling for the Young

level was 61 months

(and the small sample),

it is not u nrea

sonable to consider that the difference between Cl and CEN
for the Young subjects may be due to a real sampling e rror—
the probability of such was determined to be about

.05.

The paradigm^ hierarchy at each Age level was also
investigated.

Table 4.23 shows the results of ordered c o m 

parisons of the paradigms for the Young
and ETOT,

subjects.

For JTOT,

CEN is significantly less difficult than the other

paradigms,

and there

are no other differences of note.

The

CEN-Young performance has been previously cited as an anomaly
and the significant difference laid to sampling error,
is,

a type

I error was in fact made.

The results for the paradigm comparisons
age are presented

in Table 4.24.

CEN are significantly
marginally so
children

that

(jd

(£<.05)

<.10)

for CIC.

at the Mid

For all criteria,

Cl and

less difficult than CE,

and

The comparisons for the Old

in Table 4.25 yield the hierarchy that has been pre

viously found with the nominal and Sequence interval level
data.
and CE,

That is,

both Cl and CEN are less difficult than CIC

and neither CIC-CE or CI-CEN are significantly di f 

ferent from each other.
involves the Conflict,

The decalage

among the paradigms

but not the Object,

dimension.
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TABLE 4.23

ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES
CONSERVATION PARADIGMS FOR THE

CE

CIC

IN THE FOUR

YOUNG CHILDREN

Cl

CEN

Judgment Criterion
CE

.143

CIC

.429

2.167*

.286

2.023*

Cl

1.738**

5(£.01 )*

1.660

1.890

2.030

5 (_g_. 05 )**

1.249

1.500

1 .650

Judge/Explain Criterion
CE

.285

CIC

.8571

6.667**

.571 4

6.381

Cl

5.809

S( cl-01 )*

6.710

7.6300

8.21 0

5(£. 05)**

5.050

6.0600

6.680

Elkind
CIC

.571

Cl

Criterion
.777

5.330*

.206

4.760*

CE

4.550**

S(a .01 )*

3.780

4.310

4.630

5(a .05)**

2.850

3.420

3.770
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TABLE 4.23

ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES

IN THE

FOUR

CONSERVATION PARADIGMS FOR THE MIDDLE CHILDREN

CE

CIC

CEN

Cl

Judgment Criterion
CE

.430

CIC

1.77**

1.98**

1 .34

1 .54

CEN
S(_g.01 )*

1 .660

1 .89

2.08

5 (c[. 05 )**

1 .249

1 .50

1.65

Judge/Explain Criterion
CE

1 .750

CIC

6.55**

7.15**

4.80

5.40

CEN
S (cl-01 )*

6.710

7.63

8.21

S(£.05)**

5 .050

6.05

5.40

Elkind Criterion
CE

.444

CIC

3.40**

3.80**

2.86

3.35

CEN
S ( £ . 0 1 )*

3 .780

4.31

4.63

S(a .05)**

2.850

3.41

3.77
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TABLE 4.25

ORDERED COMPARISONS OF MEAN PERFORMANCES

IN THE FOUR

CONSERVATION PARADIGMS FOR THE OLD CHILDREN

CIC

CE

CEN

Cl

Judgment Criterion
CIC

.1 43

CE

2.25*

3.285*

2.1 1 *

3.140*

CEN

1 .030

5(a .01 )*

1 .660

1 .89

2.030

Stja.05)**

1 .249

1 .50

1 .650

Judge/Explain Crit erion
CIC

.571

CE

8.25*

1 2 .000*

7.67*

11.420*
3. 750

CEN
S ( £ . 0 1 )*

6.710

7.63

8.210

5 (jg. 05 )**

5.050

6.06

6.680

Elkind Criterion
CIC

1.17

CE

5.25*

7.030*

4.08**

6.280*

CEN

2.350

S(a .D1 )*

3.7B

4.31

4.630

5(£.05)**

2.85

3.42

3.770
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Fortuity of Group Performances
A distinct benefit of constructing

fortuitous models

is that the performance of an individual or a group can be
objectively categorized
factors or not.

as being due to inherent chance

In the present study an individual's

classi

fication as pass or fail was based upon the probability that
their score was of the null or fortuitous population of
scores.

Similarly a group performance can be so evaluated,

either by a goodness of fit test of observed vs expected
frequencies/probabilities or by determining

the probability

that a given sample mean came from the null population.
this

study the latter technique was selected,

to the sometimes limited

For

primarily due

sample size for certain of the

groups of interest and also because

it is just as rigorous

as the former but can be implemented with

a good deal more

facility.
The normal standard deviates and respective s i g n i f i 
cance levels for the paradigms and,
intra-paradigm groups

are shown in Table 4.26.

culation for the Old children
is given below.

are 7.365 and 5.902,

respectively.
respectively,

The standard error of the mean is \45.902/7 =

.918 and the resultant z_ score is,
3.18.

A sample ca l 

the mean and variance of

From Table 4.18 the group mean and size are,
10.286 and 7.

the

in Cl under the Elkind criterion

From Table 3.7,

the null distribution

at each Age level,

(10.286 - 7.365)/.91 8 =

The null hypothesis is rejected

(ja <.001),

and it is

concluded that the Old subjects did not perform fortuitiously
in Cl.
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TABLE 4.26

SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL5 OF GROUP PERFORMANCES FOR THE
CONSERVATION PARADIGMS:

OVERALL AND AT EACH

AGE LEVEL

Elkind

Judgment
Age

n

1

7

.377

-4.93

.001

.918

-4.75

.001

2

9

.333

-4.34

.001

.809

-3.67

.001

3

B

.353

-5.66

.001

.737

-5.58

.001

1

9

.333

- 6.00

.001

.809

-4.44

.001

2

8

.353

-5 .31

.001

.737

-4.56

.001

3

7

.3 77

-4.91

.001

.91 8

-3.19

.001

1

7

.377

-4.16

.001

.918

-4.13

.001

2

10

.31 6

.32

.3 70

.591

.74

.230

3

7

.377

3 .40

.001

.91 8

3.18

.001

1

6

.408

.41

.340

.991

.97

.1 70

2

10

.31 6

-.32

.370

.591

-.11

.460

3

8

.353

.71

.240

.737

1 .54

.060

CIC

24

.204

-8.57

.001

.495

-7.55

.001

CE

24

.204

-9.39

.001

.495

-6.72

.001

Cl

24

.204

-.25

.400

.495

-.15

.450

CEN

24

.204

.39

.350

.495

1.19

.1 20

Paradigm

CIC

CE

Cl

CEN

x

Z

P

x

Z

P

Paradigm
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Inspection of Table 4.26 shows that all performances
in Concrete Conflict paradigms were significantly
worse than fortuitous,
(CI-Young)

whereas only a single

(jd .^.05)

Imagery mean

was significantly below the chance level.

The

Old subjects in both Cl and CEIM can be said to have exceeded
a fortuitous
and Cl,

score while the probabilities

for the CEN-Young

CEN-Mid groups indicate an apparent transitional

stage which is neither below or above fortuity.

The p r o b a 

bilities for overall performances in each paradigm imply that
for the age range explored,
below fortuity,

CIC and CE are

Cl and CEN are likely fortuitous,

hierarchy of fortuitousness,
CE ^

significantly

i.e.,

difficulty,

and the

is CIC =

Cl = CEN.

Convergence of Scoring Criteria and
Statistical Analyses

Nominal Level Data
The three criteria yielded largely comparable results
and the number of subjects passed

under each of them was

consistent with the respective fortuitous significance levels.
JETOT

(jd<.06)

16 passes,

JTOT

was the most stringent criterion and yielded
(£.4.. 06) was next with

17 passes and ETOT

.12 ) was the most permissive and netted 20 passes.
Transitivity was evidenced

as there were no instances where

a subject who passed a more stringent criterion failed to
pass one less stringent.
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The above results are interpreted as being c o n 
sistent with expectations,

though it could be somewhat

prising that the difference between
greater.

JTOT and JETOT was not

The acceptable explanations were

the paradigms,and doubtless

sur

the same for all

the rigor of a given explanation

should be conceived of as a function of the paradigm o b s t a 
cles.

For example,

in Cl an explanation like,

same stuff so it's the same amount,"
in this study,
CIC.

"it's the

though quite acceptable

is far less rigorous than if it were given in

This is reasonable because in Cl the implication

same amount

of

from same stuff is not challenged as it is in

CIC since there is no hard percept to contradict the identity.
There was only one subject who passed a Concrete Conflict
task,

and it is suggested that the lack of variation between

JTOT and JETOT is due to the facility with which i d e n t i t y 
like arguments did suff i c e — for the child.

It is likely that

all the subjects who made correct judgments had available,
and were content with,
argument.

at least the perceptually-based

identity

In the presence of the hard conflict the child,

when inclined to give correct judgments on the intuitive
level,

would be not so easily disposed

exacting identity explanations,

to offer the less-

thus making this argument

more rigorous in the face of the percept.

Had the identity

argument been disallowed and only those alluding to
the difference in heights as moot accepted,
had only B passes.

I/R or

JETOT would

have

Ordinarily in the standard paradigm

(CE)

1 3B

the JETOT criterion successes are found to be a proper su b 
set of JTOT successes
Gruen,

1970).

(Gruen,

1 965;

Brainerd,

1971 ; Rodin &.

Perhaps this is due in part to the reason

cited above.

Interval Level Data
The Wilks likelihood ratio was adopted
means of establishing

a distribution-free

discriminability of the various effects.
the 1

-J\~values

as a general

indication of the
For each criterion

for seven of the effects were factor

analyzed to determine the correspondences

among the scoring

procedures and the analyses of variance performed on the
resultant data.

The factor analyses were

done separately for

the Sequence and the Age as factors designs.
With the Sequence design there were nine different
analyses of variance;

three for each

seven main and interaction effects

of the criterion.

(Memory was not considered)

were treated as the entities,and the specific
variance technique was considered a variable.
a seven-row by nine-column matrix.
the variables was less than

The

analysis of
This yielded

No correlation between

.98 and the principal components

solution showed only a single factor which accounted for
about 99 percent of the variability.
ables,

correlation matrix

in the Appendix in Tables

The key to the var i 

and factor matrix,

are presented

3, 4, and 5, respectively.

Six different analyses of variance were performed for
the Age design,

two for each criterion.

A seven-row by six-

column raw data matrix was reduced to a six-by-six c o r r e l a 
tion matrix

and factor

analyzed.

The lowest correlation was

.936 and the first component accounted for 98.3 percent of
the variability.

The key to the variables,

matrix and factor matrix,

correlation

are shown in the Appendix

in Tables

6 , 7, and 8 , respectively.
These findings require little elaboration
clear that the three scoring criteria,
gave highly consistent
between criteria.

results,

as it is

however analyzed,

both within criterion and
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SECTION V

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Introduction
As the results were voluminous,
descriptive,

though largely self-

the summary and discussion below are presented

in the interest of coherence

and with the recognition

subterfuge as a wholly damnable art.
mental hypotheses of the study,

of

Regarding the f unda

the various separate analyses

of the raw data afforded no uninterpretable surprises and led
to the same set of conclusions.

Although

fertile ground for any considerable

it does not provide

rhetoric,

the state of

the results is not to be deplored and in itself may be a most
salient aspect of the study.
results will be brief.

At any rate,

But before proceeding

of hopefully sound implication,
a succinct and explicit

the discussion of
to a synthesis

it would be helpful to give

summary of the results most pertinent

to the decalage hypothesis.

Summary of Results
Of the five independent variables to which group d i f 
ferences could be attributed,
Age factor were of import and,

only the Conflict factor and
in the final distillation,

their effect was essentially of an interactive nature.
is,

That

the most important differential performance between the

Imagery and Concrete levels was for the Middle and Old c h i l 
dren.

At the former Age level,

(jd 4.05)

CEN and Cl were markedly

less difficult than CE and only moderately

easier than CIC.

But for the Old children the two

(ja <.10)
Imagery

paradigms were significantly easier than CE or CIC,

and the

hierarchy unambiguously established as CE = CIC > Cl = CEN.
Also,

at considerably higher statistical

this hierarchy was found

power,

precisely

(ja < . 0 1 ) for the overall paradigm

means.
In Concrete Conflict paradigms a child's

age was of

no c o n s e q u e n c e — all groups performed significantly below the
fortuitous level,

and there were no important differences

between intra-paradigm Age levels or between intra-Age level
paradigms.

The Middle and Old children did better than the

Young on the Cl problems

and not differently from each other,

but there was no apparent trend for Age in CEN,

primarily

because the Young children scored inordinately high in CEN.
The Old children performed
level in Cl and CEN,
the former paradigm.
paradigms

significantly beyond the fortuitous

with the strongest performance being in
The overall scores in the respective

showed performance

to be well below chance levels

in CE and .CIC but clearly within fortuitous

expectations for

Cl and CEN.
The Sequence,

Memory,

and Object factors were of no

general consequence in the experiment.

There was

cation that the Recall cue for Within Object
attenuate

scores,

as it should since

some ind i 

tasks tended to

in these paradigms it
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can cause the child to reflect on the initial configuration.
The debilitating effect of the Recall cue was notic e a b l e —
though

not statistically s i g n i f i c a n t — in Cl where there was

substantial variation.
incorrect
expected

In CIC,

subjects uniformly made

judgments because of the concrete percept.

It was

that the Recall would aid solution to the Between

Object p r o blems--especially if a transitivity argument
employed--and be detrimental

for Within Object tasks,

is
since

there it would further alert the child to the original c o n 
figuration.

The former enhancement was not at all realized

and the latter expectation was only somewhat the case.
The judgment,

judge/explain,

Elkind criteria and

the measurement level of the data did not make any s u b 
stantive difference in the conclusions
results.

Theoretically,

more

permitted by the

information is accrued

interval level than at the nominal level,

at the

and the p a r a 

metric techniques are more powerful in teasing out statist ically-significant

differences.

interval data was in evidence,

The superior power of the

but no decisions that were

logically permissible at this higher level of measurement
were contradictory to those made at the lower level.
within a level of measurement,
consistent

results and,

ences in power,
dame.

Also,

each of the criteria yielded

except for occasional small di f f e r 

the decisions regarding effects were the
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The Status of the Identity
Equivalence Decalage
It is doubtless that there exists a decalage between
Cl and CE,

and that Cl is developmentally prior to CE--this

much of Elkind's formulation was not contested.

The co m 

ponent of CE largely responsible for the decalage is not based
in the number of stimulus objects,

but instead upon the co n 

crete perceptual disparity of the altered and unaltered
objects,

which irresistably suggests

to pre-operational

children that there is also no quantitative

equivalence.

When the differential configuration is concrete for a single
object conservation task

(CIC),

the pre-operational subject

is just as impelled by the appearance of inequality as in the
Between Object task

(CE).

Likewise,

in the Between paradigm

where the perceptual disparity is not directly visible but
left to imagery

(CEN),

the subjects performed

the Within-Imagery paradigm
The Elkind
ated entirely,

(1967),

(Cl).

hypothesis

is diminished,

by the above findings.

that TGE is correct

as well as in

in its assumption,

though not v i t i 

It should be accepted
rejected by Elkind

that identity and equivalence conservation

taneous in development.

Of course,

are s imul

in the implicit equation

of identity and equivalence conservation,

Piaget must have

assumed that the crucial components in the problem are also
equated.
decalage

Elkind's definition and subsequent labeling of the
issue is seen to be spurious since identity par a 

digms are not easier than equivalence paradigms.

The decalage

should be analyzed in terms of the relative concreteness of
the antagonistic perceptual data,

the number of stimulus

objects apparently not withstanding.

The relative c o n crete

ness of the configurative differences is tantamount to the
degree of counter suggestion to the logically correct c o n 
clusion.

If the difference in configuration is left to a

remembered image,

then the suggestion contrary to equal

amounts is of doubtful presence.

On the other hand,

perceptual discrepancy is concrete,
trolled and maximal.

In passing,

if the

its impact is both c o n 

it should be emphasized that

it does not necessarily follow that incremental concreteness
or incremental differences in the perceptual discrepancy will
lead to a decrement in solution for a given age group.
is,

That

the relationship between concreteness of percept and

solution is not expected to be a monotonic or continuous
function.

Some Concluding Observations
The relative ordinal weights of the paradigm obstacles
— Conflict,

Object,

M e m o r y — defined in Section

cated by the results.

The Memory and Object

little consequence in discriminating
— in all cases 1 - _/V<. 01 .

II.5 are v i n d i 

factors were of

between group performances

The only instance where either of

these factors were implicated by differences was in an Object
by Memory interaction for the Elkind criterion,
was only interpretable in terms of the Conflict.

but even this
The Recall

cue did not enhance performance in the equivalence paradigms
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but it did diminish scores

in identity paradigms where in

fact the cue calls attention to the configurative disparency
of the object states,

thus increasing the likelihood of a

remembered image and a cognitive conflict.
The resultant net ranking indicated for across
obstacles was,

Conflict > Object = Memory,

while the d i f f i 

culty weights for intra-obstacle levels was Concrete
Imagery,

Within = Between,

Recall 2 No Recall

Recall = No Recall

(in identity).

>

(inequivalence),

These ordinal weights are

not strictly amenable to inferences beyond the age range
sampled in the study and are most applicable to the Middle
(5 years,
example,

5 months)

and Old

perhaps older,

children would

(6 years) Age levels.

For

more conservation-sophisticated

rely on a transitivity solution to CE,

in

which case the Recall cue could be of some benefit.
In that the Genevans are well aware of the CI-CE
decalage,

and doubtless of its source,

the results of this

study are of rather scant importance to TGE and its serious
practitioners.
invariant

This dissertation,

as expected,

leaves TGE

and simply points out those aspects of the c o n s e r 

vation paradigms which contribute to variation in solution
behavior among children who have not yet developed the requi
site structure.
As discussed in Section
possible solution modes,

II,

Cl has a multiplicity of

many of which

reversibility and concrete operations.

are irrelevant to TGE,
A remembered percept

could be sufficient to provoke a conflict in Cl or CEN,

but

there is no readily apparent method to ascertain that a child
is sufficiently cognizant of the configurative differences.
To define the conflict as sufficient on the basis of an
incorrect response would be to carry operationalism to perhaps
its most absurd logical end.

The

Imagery paradigms are ill

conceived for assessment of concrete operations

and,

as there

are numerous possible interpretations of the meaning of a
correct response,

their utility for any current theoretical

position is likely to be persistently equivocal.
CIC is developmentally equivalent to CE and both of
these paradigms are more difficult than Cl and CEN.

As the

latter pair of paradigms do not include the concrete percept
obstacle and T5 does not directly account
disparity in CE,
observing

for the perceptual

the Cl + TS = CE model is inadequate.

the concrete perceptual disparity in CIC,

who can deal with Cl would

But it could be that a

CIC + 0 = CE is tenable.

CIC includes

the concrete percept of CE but lacks its multiple
aspect.

a child

not be necessarily expected to

succeed in CIC,and likewise for CE.
scheme of the form,

Upon

The mental operation(s)

stimuli

necessary to compensate for

the latter obstacle in the CE paradigm is represented by 0
and could be the transitivity-syllogism proposed by Elkind
(1967).

However,

the evidence accumulated here indicates

that the set of successes in CE that are a proper subset of
CIC is the empty or null set,

i.e.,

CIC = CE and no o p e r a 

tions developmentally beyond CIC are required to solve CE.
On the other hand the lack of a CIC-CE decalage could be an
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artifact of the ages
except one,

sampled in the study.

failed the

haps a decalage does

All the subjects,

Concrete Conflict paradigms.

exist

Per

for children further into the co n 

crete operational period.
A normative interpretation of the results must obtain
that CIC and CE are simultaneous in development,

but this in

no way precludes that CIC + TS,

can afford

solutions to CE.

or even Cl + T5,

One avenue to the assessment of 0 would be

to instruct pre-operational subjects in CIC and some other
task where success is postulated to be a behavioral c o n s e 
quence of the operation 0 , and then observe if there is a
solution to CE where previously there was none.

A direct

training method like the above might be objectionable on the
grounds that,

increments

in performance would primarily be

indicative of response transfer,

and not of a rigorous

opment of the notion of conservation.
insufficiently voiced objection,

devel

This is a valid and

but with proper experimental

and statistical controls for the detection of simple transfer
of r e s p o n s e s — a variation on fortuitous pe r f o r m a n c e — some
useful information could be derived from direct training
approaches.

At any rate it seems apparent that,

replication efforts,

additional indirect

in lieu of

studies such as the

present one cannot resolve the immanence of 0 .
•]

a) The configurative disparity (B vs B*) may have
been sufficiently attended to or b) a nonrigorous conclusion
of B = B*, plus TS, could be a way of deducing that the configurative disparity of A and B* is, in logical fact, moot.
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GLDS5ARY OF SYMBOLS

An object employed

in conservation paradigms which

remains in an unaltered state throughout the task.
Anova

Univariate

(dependent)

analysis of variance.

B

An object employed in conservation paradigms which
is altered in configuration during the task.

B*

An object in the conservation paradigms which results
from the configurative

alteration of object B during

the task.
CD

A direct comparison task where the subject is required
to judge the ordinal relationship

of amount for

material in two cylindrical containers.
are equal and the diameters of the

The amounts

two containerscan

be identical or different.
CD'

A direct comparison task where the subject

is

required to judge the ordinal relationship of amount
for material in two cylindrical
ent diameters.

The heights of mater i a l in each c o n 

tainer are equal,
CE

A two-object

containers of d i f f e r 

thus the amounts

(equivalence)

where the unaltered object,
the altered object,

are different.

conservation paradigm
that

is compared with

can be directly perceived t h r o u g h 

out the task.
CEN

A two-object

(equivalence)

where the unaltered object,

conservation paradigm
that

is compared with

the altered object,

cannot be directly perceived

once the initial equality of the two objects has
been established prior to the alteration of one of
them.
A single-object

(identity)

conservation paradigm

where there is no concrete percept of the initial
configuration of the object after its configuration
alteration.
A single-object
where there is

(identity)
a

conservation paradigm

concrete percept of the initial

configuration of the object after its configuration
alteration.
Conservation

of continuous

quantity.

The object is

a fluid which is contained in a cylindrical t r a n s 
parent beaker.
Conservation of discontinuous quantity.
is a mass of numerous small elements
which are contained

The object

(e.g.,

beads)

in a cylindrical transparent

beaker.
The identity transformation element of an algebraic
Group.

the operation of identity upon any element

of the Group leaves it saliently unaltered.
Identity-Reversibility concrete

logical operations

postulated by Piaget to account for the q u a n t i t a 
tive conservations developed during the concrete
operational period.
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Wilks'

likelihood ratio criterion;

(error + hypothesis)

error variation/

variation.

Manova

Multivariate

0

A mental operation that can take any definition,
i.e.,

(dependent)

analysis of variance.

a variable.

RM

Repeated measures

univariate analysis of variance.

TGE

General theory of genetic e p i s t e m o l o g y , after J.
Piaget.

T5

Transitivity-Syllogistic deductive ability postulated
by David Elkind to ultimately account

for the quanti

tative conservations of the concrete operational
period.
Equivalence
conservation

A between objects conservation paradigm,

ing two distinct objects,

em p l o y 

in which one of them u n d e r 

goes a configurative alteration

and where the crucial

quantitative comparison is between the altered object
and the unaltered object.
Group

An abstract algebraic

structure or set of elements

which has a rule of combination for elements that
invariably yields an element of the set,
the properties of associativity,
reversibility
Identity
conservation

and exhibits

identity,

and

(inverse).

A within object conservation paradigm employing

only a single object which

undergoes

a configurative

alteration and where the crucial quantitative c o m 
parison refers to the altered and initial states of
the object.
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TABLE A .1

DESCRIPTION AND COLUMN LAYOUT OF RAW DATA

Description

1 -3

Subject number

5

CQ in Recall score,

judgment

6

DQ in Recall score,

judgment

7

Subtotal score in Recall,

B

CQ in

No

Recall score,

judgment

9

DQ in

No

Recall score,

judgment

judgment

10

Subtotal Score in No Recall,

11

Total score on judgment

13

CQ in Recall score,

judge/explain

14

DQ in Recall score,

judge/explain

15

Subtotal score in Recall,

16

CQ in

No

Recall score,

judge/explain

17

DQ in

No

Recall score,

judge/explain

1B

Subtotal score in No Recall,

judge/explain

19-2

Total score on judge/explain

(JETOT)

(JTOT)

judge/explain

22

Subtotal score in Recall,

23

Subtotal score in No Recall,

24-2

Total score on Elkind

26

Pretest score

27-i

Age in months

Elkind
Elkind

(ETOT)

29

Sex,

30
36

Sample source,
market
Object factor,

37

Conflict factor,

1 = Concrete,

38

Sequence factor,

1 = Recall first,

39

Paradigm designation, 1 = Cl, 2 = CEN, 3 = CIC,
4 = CE
Age factor, 1 = Young, 2 = Middle, 3 = Old
Age level median split, 1 = Low, 2 = High

40
41

1 = female,

judgment

2 = male

1 = Ferland,
1 = Within,

1 = Durham,

3 = New

2 = Between
2 = Imagery

2 = Recall second

TABLE A.2

RAW DATA

11
1

21

41

31

0000000 000000 0 22 466311

2 0000000 000000 0 22 466821

3 0000000 000000 0 22 466221
4 0000000 000000 0 1 1 226211
5 0000000 000000 0 22 466111
6 0000000 000000 0 22 465721
7 0000000 000000 0 22 467221
8 0000000 000000 0 1 1 266011
9 0000000 000000 0 22 465821
1 D 0000000 000000 0 22 446121
1 1 0000000 000000 0 1 1 267221
1 2 1121124 4484481 6 661266811
1 3 0000000 000000 0 22 466411
1 4 1121124 44844816 661 26731 1
1 5 0000000 000000 0 22 457321
1 6 0000000 000000 0 22 466211
1 7 0000000 000000 0 22 467211
1 8 0000000 000000 0 1 1 246121
1 9 0000000 000000 0 22 467121
20 1120002 224000 4 62 867311
21 1121124 44844816 661266411
22 1121124 44844816 661266421
23 1121124 44844816 661267221
24 0000000 000000 0 22 467111
25 1 01 1 1 23 202224 6 36 956121
26 0000000 000000 0 22 467421
27 1 01 1 1 23 202224 6 63 966221
28 1121124 44844816 661267321
29 0110001 022000 2 32 567311
30 1120113 44804412 651166411
31 1121124 44844816 661266811
32 0110001 044000 4 52 766911
33 0000000 000000 0 22 467311
34 0000000 000000 0 22 466021
35 0000000 000000 0 22 467411
3 6 0000000 000000 0 22 456011
37 0000000 000000 0 22 456511
38 0000000 000000 0 22 466221
39 01 1 1 123 □4444812 3 6 967211
40 1121124 44844816 661266321

21 1 4
21 1 4
21 24
21 24
21 14
211 4
21 24

21

22
21
21

11
1 1

32

1211 1 1
121 1 1 1
1113 1 1
1113 32
121 1 22
1 1 23 21
1 221 32
1 123 32
1113 21
1113 32
1 123 1 1
1 123 32
121 1 32

1221
1221
1221
221 2
221 2
221 2
2222
2222
221 2
2222
2222
21 1 4
211 4
21 1 4
21 24
21 24
2124
21 24

21
21
32
32
11

32

21
32
32

21
22

32
32
1 1

32

11
22
21

1211 32
1211 21
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21

11
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

□001011
01 10001
0001122
0000000
1121124

0000000
0000000
0000000
0000111
0001011
1 1 201 1 3

0000000
0000000
0000000
0000000
1121124
1121124

0000000
0000000
0000000
0000000
1121124

0000000
1121124

0000000
6 6 0000000
67 1121124

68 0000000
69 0110001
70 0000000
71 1010001
72 0000000
73 0000000
74 0000000
75 0000000
76 0000000
77 0000000
78 0000111
79 0001122
80 0000000

000202 2 25 735421
022000 2 31 465911
000224 4 16 766921
000000 0 22 466711
4 4 8 4 4 B 1 6 661266421
!0 11 266421
0 22 465321
0 11 266421
2 1 3 466521
2 1 3 466011
224022 6 641055011
000000 0 11 266411
000000 0 22 466413
000000 0 1 1 267022
000000 0 22 4661 1 2
4484481 6 661267322
44844816 661267522
000000 0 21 366822
000000 0 22 4661 1 2
000000 0 1 1 266923
000000 0 22 467323
44344816 661267023
000000 0 22 466613
44844816 661266513
000000 0 22 466813
000000 0 22 467323
4484481 6 661 266323
000000 0 1 1 255613
022000 2 32 566423
000000 0 11 255813
202000 2 52 736723
000000 0 22 465523
000000 0 11 265723
000000 0 1 1 266023
000000 0 1 1 256713
000000 0 22 467213
000000 0 22 466023
000022 2 1 3 426023
000224 4 1 6 756713
000000 0 1 1 266523

000000
000000
000000
000022
000202

41

31

121 1 1 1
1221 32
1221 32
1113 21
1113 21
221 2 21
1113 1 1
1 123 21
1 1 23 22
1 1 23 1 1
221 2 11
2222 21
2222 21
1113 32
21 24 11
221 2 32
2222 32
21 1 4 22

2222 1 1
1113 32
1 1 23 32
121 1 32

221 2 22
2222 22
1221 22
21 1 4 32

2222
1221
221 2
1221
21 24
21 24
21 1 4
1 123

1221

21
11
21
11
22
11
11
11
22

21 1 4 32
2124 11

121 1 1 1
121 1 22
121 1 22
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11
81
82
83
84
85

1121124 44844816

31
661256013

0001011 000202 2 25 767023
0000000 000000 0 1 1 246623
01 1 1 1 23 022224 6 561166413
1121124 44844816

86 0000000
87 0000000
88 0000000
89 0000000
90 0000000
91 0000000
92
93
94
95
96

21

000000
000000
000000
000000
000000
000000

0
0
0
0
0
0

1011123 40444812
1121124 42644814

0000000 000000 0
0000000 000000 0
0000000 000000 0

661267413
468013
466723
466623
465413
456923
245523
561166113
66 1266923
22 466623
12 365823
22 466013

22
22
22
22
22
11

41

221 2 1 1
2222 32
1 1 23 22
1211 21
1221 32
1 1 23 32

1221 22
22
11

1 1 23
21 14
21 24
'1113

32

11
2222 1 1
221 2 32
1113 22
1113 1 1
2212 1 1
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TABLE A . 3

KEY TO VARIABLES
ANALYSIS:

FOR THE CONVERGENCE

SEQUENCE A5 A FACTOR

Description

Variable

1

Anova,

JTOT

2

Anova,

JETOT

3

Anova,

ETOT

4

Manova,

Judgment

5

Manova,

Judge/explain

6

Manova,

Elkind

7

RM,

Judgment

8

RM,

Judge/explain

9

RM,

Elkind
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TABLE A.4

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR CONVERGENCE
A N A L Y 5 I 5 : SEQUENCE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

.998

3

.998

.997

4

.994

.990

.994

5

.996

.996

.997

.997

6

.986

.983

.990

.993

.993

7

1 .000

.998

.998

.994

.996

.9B6

8

.998

1 .000

.997

.990

.996

.983

.998

9

.998

.997

1 .000

.994

.997

.990

.998

8

.997
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TABLE A . 5

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR CONVERGENCE
ANALYSIS:

SEQUENCE

Variable

Factor 1

1

.999

2

.998

3

.999

4

.996

5

.999

6

.991

7

.999

8

.998

9

.999
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TABLE A.6

KEY TO VARIABLES
ANALYSIS:

FOR THE CONVERGENCE
AGE AS A FACTOR

Description

Variable

1

Anova,

JTOT

2

Anova,

JETOT

3

Anova,

ETOT

4

Manova,

judgment

5

Manova,

judge/explain

6

Manova,

Elkind

TABLE A . 7

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR CONVERGENCE
ANALYSIS:

1

2

AGE

3

4

2

.995

3

.994

.991

4

.997

.991

.994

5

.994

.996

.993

.996

6

.944

.936

.951

.966

5

.960

TABLE A .B

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR CONVERGENCE
ANALYSIS:

Variable

AGE

Factor 1

1

.995

2

.993

3

.995

4

.999

5

.998

6

.967
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TABLE A.9

TRANSCRIPT DF EXPLANATIONS AND ACCEPTABLE/UNACCEPTABLE
5TATU5 AS RATED BY JUDGES A AND B

S No.

Judgments
correct

Status*
A
B

12

4

It's the same water and then
it's the same amount.

14

4

Same amount still because the
tall glass is skinnier.

21

4

Don't really know why but it
would be different if you added
some.

22

4

Glass is bigger but it's
skinnier too.

23

4

You didn't add any s t u f f — the
other glass is just taller.

25

3

I don't k n o w .

X

X

27

3

It just is.

X

X

28

4

It's the same green water about
as high; it's lower because
it's fatter.

30

3

Same water, so same amount too.
Other glass is skinnier.

31

4

Only the glass is bigger,
skinnier.

39

3

The glass is different
water is the same.

40

4

5ame water but different glass.

43

2

I don't know.

X

X

45

4

You just poured the same water.
You didn't add any.

51

3

X

X

56

4

Description

it's

but the

Only poured it from one to
another, still the same amount
in the two cups.

1 66

57

4

Just one glass to the other,
none spilled.

67

4

Just a bigger glass but same
amount to drink.

62

4

You just dumped it all.

64

4

It just looks different.

79

2

I just don't know why.

X

92

3

It's only fuller.

X

93

4

Only glasses are different.
I just think so.

X

X

X

X

84

3

Because,

05

4

Still same, just fatter
t h a t 's a l l .

81

4

Same as before,
poured it.

*x = unacceptable

I don't know.

you just

X

